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INTRODUCTION 
Around the t u r n o f the cen tu ry a r e v o l u t i o n began i n 
Ph i l osophy wh ich i s n o t y e t o v e r . T h i s r e v o l u t i o n b r o u g h t 
about such a fundamental s h i f t i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach 
t h a t i f one i s t o understand the s t a t e o f ph i losophy today , 
i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e c o u r s e o f t h a t 
r e v o l u t i o n wh ich compr i ses t h e g r o w t h and deve lopmen t o f 
a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y . I t i s p a l p a b l e i n t h e h i s t o r y o f 
ph i losophy t h a t d i f f e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i e s emerge i n response t o 
e a c h o t h e r . But i t wou ld be s u p e r f i c i a l t o see a n a l y t i c a l 
ph i losophy as a s i n g l e response t o any one system or approach 
o f p h i l o s o p h y . T h e r e i s , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , no s i n g l e 
ph i losophy o f a n a l y s i s . A l though a n a l y s i s o f concepts has 
been p r a c t i s e d i n one form or the o the r f rom p r e - S o c r a t i c 
p h i l o s o p h i e s t o r e c e n t t i m e s , i t i s o n l y i n c o n t e m p o r a r y 
p h i l o s o p h y t h a t t he c o n t r a s t be tween a n a l y s i s and o t h e r 
methods becomes sharp l y c l e a r . 
There a re as s a i d above, many s t y l e s and app roaches 
w i t h i n or c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y , e . g . , 
L o g i c a l Atomism, L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s m , O r d i n a r y Language 
P h i l o s o p h y o r L i n g u i s t i c P h i l o s o p h y , F o r m a l A n a l y s i s , 
In fo rmal Ana lys i s and L i n g u i s t i c Phenomenology. A l l these 
approaches share a common c o n c e r n w i t h l a n g u a g e , and have 
emerged as mutually contrastive developments along related 
lines. What is common to all analytic philosophers is the 
premise that the task of a philosopher ought to be to 
analyze language in general and to understand the structure 
of language by a careful study of its elements and inter-
relations, and that the philosopher's job is to cure us of 
muddles generated by language: either by everyday language or 
by the technical language of the sciences. 
At the moment analytic techniques have come to dominate 
the practice of the majority of English speaking 
philosophers, and analysis is the dominant mode of 
philosophizing in England, and America, and to a lesser yet 
significant extent in France, Germany, Russia and the far 
east. The contemporary linguistic philosophy has been 
practised, more or less in a similar fashion although with a 
somewhat different distribution of emphasis in Cambridge 
and Oxford. In terms of origin, linguistic philosophy flows 
from the analytic impulse generated by the work of Moore, 
Wittigenstein and Wisdom in Cambridge, and flourished in 
Oxford with the work of Ryle, Austin and Strawson. Linguistic 
be 
Philosophy, as it has come to/called, exhibits features which 
are based upon a characteristic kind of recourse to ordinary 
usage of language, so it is also called the 'ordinary 
language philosophy'. 
P r i m a r i l y ' l i n g u i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y ' i s the name of a 
ph i l osoph i ca l method - t h a t i s the a n a l y s i s of how words 
func t ion and how they re la te to the world in our ordinary 
usage of language. Both Moore and Russe l l be l i eved t h a t 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p rob lems can be s o l v e d by a b e t t e r 
understanding of the meaning of words and sentences in our 
o r d i n a r y d i s c o u r s e . T h i s new approach was e v i d e n t i n 
Russel l 's 'Theory of Descriptions* and Moore's 'Defence of 
Common s e n s e ' . By h i s t h e o r y R u s s e l l d i s p e l l e d a 
phi losophical puzzle about the status of f i c t i t i o u s objects 
by c lose ly at tending to the meaning of words and sentences. 
Moore propounded tha t the analysis of statements about our 
o rd inary percept ions of e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
should be analysed in terms of our common sense i n t u i t i o n s 
and not in terms of contr ived phi losophical premises which 
went against the grain of ordinary speech. 
C.A. Caton says, " I mean by "ord inary" language every-day 
language rather than simply any (par t o f ) language which 
a group of people shares. Ordinary language in t h i s sense 
i s the language wh ich d e f i n e s t he bounda r ies o f 
l i n g u i s t i c communit ies, the boundar ies w i t h i n which 
people speak. The same language or a t l e a s t the same 
d i a l e c t . I t i s the language t h a t makes p o s s i b l e t h e i r 
da i l y dealings wi th each other . I t w i l l be a large par t 
of what a phys ic is t or a carpenter uses in t a l k i ng or 
w r i t t i n g to h is col leagues, a s t i l l larger part of what 
Wittigenstien's later philosophy also dealt with the ordinary 
usage of language, but in a rather different way. It was a 
departure from Russell and Moore's philosophy of ordinary 
language. Wittigenstien said that Philosophy is a battle 
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language and believed in the minute analysis of how words 
are employed in ordinary language. He pictured philosophy as 
the activity of analyzing the presupositions of our 
conceptual thinking and of workring out their implications. 
But Wittigenstein's contemporary, John Langshaw Austin^ 
followed the theory in a quite distinctive fashion. 
contd, 
they use in talking to their wives, and perhaps all they 
could do or could use in talking to eachother, or to 
children, shopkeepers, and policemen. Most adults are able 
to use and understand some technical language, at least 
that important in their occupation, special interests, 
and hobbies. This other part of their language can be 
used easily and naturally only with their colleagues or 
fellow fans: physicists with other physicist^, or people 
who happen to know some physics, farmers with other 
farmers or people who know something about farming 
(Caton: Philosophy and ordinary language. Introduction p. 
VI . University oflllinois, 1963), 
The analysis of ordinary language for Austin was its own 
justification, whereas for Wittiigenstein it was justified by 
the need to understand the nature of philosophical 
puzzlements, how these puzzlements capture our mind and how 
their grip can be shaken off. Austin on the otherhand 
believed in the minute analysis of the clusters of associated 
uses of words, irrespective of whether or most philosophical 
problems (in the conventional sense) were involved in them. 
This is not to suggest, however, that Austin's analyses did 
not shed significant light on several important philosophical 
problems. 
It was only at the begining of the second world war 
that the distinctiveness of Austin's method of philosophizing 
became evident, which marked his later work. He thought that 
there was no single method of philosophy, because the term 
'philosophy' covers a quite heterogenous set of inquiries 
which cannot share a single method. For instance, some of the 
traditional problems of philosophy such as free-will, truth 
etc, continued to be without a solution because according to 
Austin, these problems yet had not found the appropriate 
method. Therefore,Austin favoured a more circumspect approach 
to such problems, confining himself to the delineation of 
their semantic nuances, Austin was impatient with the 
traditional mode of philosophizing also, because to him, 
argument among philosophers seemed to consist in unending 
d i s p u t e and c o n t r o v e r s y ; d i sag reemen t and c o n t i n o u s 
re fu ta t i on and coun te r - re fu ta t i on , without any progress in 
the understanding of the problems un l ike the well regulated 
and smooth p r o g r e s s i o n o f s c i e n c e towards i t s g o a l . 
Philosophy seemed t o him at t imes t o be d i s o r d e r l y and 
inconclusive c h i e f l y due to a lack of prec is ion of thought 
and language among p h i l o s o p h e r s , r a t h e r than t h e 
r e c a l c i t r a n c e of the problems themselves . He f e l t t h a t 
inconc lus ive wrangl ing was indeed the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f 
philosophy but not i n t r i n s i c to i t . In h is view, i t was not 
that philosophy cannot progress l i k e the natural sciences. 
A u s t i n t h o u g h t t h a t i f p h i l o s o p h e r s were t o r e a l l y 
concentrate on spec i f i c questions wi th c lear demarcation of 
conceptual boundaries w i th s u f f i c i e n t r igour , i t was possible 
to get somewhere in philosophy. He disagreed wi th the view, 
accepted by a number of philosophers wi th resignat ion that 
inconc lus ive debates were i n h e r e n t t o a l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
en terpr ise . 
Therefore, Aust in d id not hes i ta te to concentrate on 
seeingly t r i v i a l d i s t i n c t i o n s in ordinary usage which to him 
in t imated important aspects of the conceptua l frameworks 
i m p l i c i t i n our t h i n k i n g . T h i s , one may say, was what led 
Austin t o attempt the p a r t i c u l a r kind of ordinary language 
analysis tha t he engaged i n . 
A u s t i n ' s technique was q u i t e d i s t i n c t i v e though he 
admired some of the methods and ob jec t ives of some other 
p h i l o s o p h e r s . He t h o u g h t t h a t the bes t method o f d o i n g 
p h i l o s o p h y was t h r o u g h group d i s c u s s i o n s , papers and 
symposium engaged in the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of spec i f i c aspects of 
a problem ra the r than long, comp l i ca ted t r e a t i s e s which 
a m b i t i o u s l y a t t e m p t e d t o s o l v e a whole p rob lem i n a 
monoli t h i c fahs ion. 
He also thought tha t the f i e l d of ordinary language was 
i t s e l f o f s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t and wor thy of keen and 
r i g o r o u s s t u d y by p h i l o s o p h e r s . I n t h i s way o f 
ph i losoph iz ing, Aust in thought he could develop a sor t of 
' labora tory technique' of doing philosophy and a proper and 
systemat ic way of ana lyz ing and s o l v i n g the problems of 
philosophy. This way of doing philosophy acknowledged Austin 
as one of the leaders of Oxford philosophy or what i s ca l led 
the o rd ina ry language ph i l osophy , i n which h i s i n tense 
in te res t centred round the phenomenon of language in terms 
of i t s f i n e nuances of usage. But h is way of dealing wi th 
l i n g u i s t i c philosophy was qu i te d i f f e r e n t and to an extent , 
even i deosync ra t i c . He d id not espouse any genera l t heo ry 
about p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f wh ich p r e s e n t e d language p r e -
8 
eminently as both its cause and solution. But he did assign 
to a peculiar kind of linguistic inquiry a central role in 
philosophical method. 
In his leading lecture 'A plea for Excuses' Austin 
refers to the method of proceeding from ordinary language 
analysis, that is, by examining 'what we should say when 
and why and what we should mean by it. This he considered, in 
itself a valid philosophical method, capable of prepapring 
the ground for seeking solutions of important philosophical 
problems. He says^ 
First, words are our tools, and, as a mininmum, we 
should use clean tools: we should know what we mean 
and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves 
against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, 
words are not (except in their- own little corner) 
facts or things: we need therefore to prise them 
off the world, to hold them apart from and against 
it, so that we can realize their inadequecies and 
arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without 
blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common 
stock of words embodies all the distinctions men 
have found worth drawing, and the connexions they 
have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many 
generations: these surely are likely to be more 
numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to 
the long test of the survival of the fittest, and 
more subtle, at least in all ordinary and 
reasonably practical matters, then any that you or 
I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an 
afternoon - the most favoured alternative 
method.^ ^ ' 
Here Austin is obviously speaking of a method of doing 
philosophy - the method of making a beginning by scrutinising 
the resources of 'ordinary lanaguage' that men have 
inherited through many generations. 
Austin's article 'A plea for Excuses' is an excellent 
illustration of his basic approach. He used the apparently 
unpromising topic of excuses for the exploration of the 
problem of free-will. In the context of this article, Austin 
outlined three 'systematic aids" or 'source books' to use 
and to work with. First of all he recommends the study of 
the dictionary to discover the extent of the 'family circle' 
of words one is concerned with in this case, the words which 
are concerned with or related to 'excuses', 'accidents', 
'misconceptions', 'mistakes' etc. Secondly, we may consult 
the common law which provides us with immense miscellany of 
untoward cases and a useful list of 'pleas', together with a 
good analysis of both - the use of such words and of the 
social contexts in which they arise. This sort of material 
for analysis of language, may be as good as the material 
supplied from ordinary language, because in law complicated 
questions are decided through a careful analysis of exact 
meanings of words. He also recommends a careful study of 
psychology including anthropology and animal studies, which 
may yield important points for analysis. 
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Austin laid great stress on the seminar or group-
thinking, procedure. He thought it essential in principle, to 
be able to agree on what was correct usage in any area. In 
group thinking we are guaranteed to some extent of avoiding 
the loose, usages of language. But the question arises, why 
study the ordinary usage of language in particular? G.G. New 
sums up Austin's response to this question under three 
points:-
(i) To understand what we mean, we must examine the 
words we use, language sets traps, especially 
for philosophers, and it is only by rigorously 
examining what we all ordinarily do with 
language that we can forearm ourselves against 
these traps. Forgetting, in the grip of some 
theory, the ordinary usage of some expression, 
we may easily slide into a misuse of it that 
leads us hopelessly astray. 
(ii) Moreover, our ordinary words are themselves 
inadequate and arbitrary. Examining how they 
work will help us to realize this and to 're-
look at the world without blinkers". Some 
actions for instance, like heaving a brick 
through your neighbour's window, involve 
physical movements. The etymology of the word 
'action', combined with our familiarity with 
realatively simple cases of actions which do 
involve physical movements, tends to suggest 
that all actions in the last analysis come down 
to making physical movements. By examining how 
the word 'action' is actually used in a variety 
of cases, we come to see that and how this 
tendency is misleading. 
(iii) The study of ordinary usage has a positive value 
also. For 'our common stock of words embodies 
all the distinctions men have found worth 
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drawing, and the connexions they have found 
w o r t h mark ing i n t he l i f e t imes o f many 
g e n e r a t i o n s ' . We should understand these a t 
least before we go any f u r t h e r . Not ic ing and 
understanding these d i s t i n c t i o n s is not merely 
looking at words. In examining how we use the 
words we do , we are a l s o examin ing t he 
' r e a l i t i e s we use the words t o t a l k a b o u t ' : 
Thus by examining the o r d i n a r y usage of the 
words wi th which we describe ac t ions, we shal l 
both r i d ourselves of possible misconceptions 
and br ing to l i g h t d i s t i n c t i o n s in the kinds 
of th ings .ao6 s i t ua t i ons we use the words to 
t a l k about.^ 
These t h r e e p o i n t s c o n s t i t u t e a j u t i f i c a t i o n o f 
Aus t in 's l i n g u i s t i c phi losophy. 
In g iv ing the above three po in ts , G.G.New aimed at the 
conclusion t h a t : 
Points ( i ) and ( i i ) declare that ordinary language 
must be i n v e s t i g a t e d so t h a t we s h a l l a vo i d 
d i s t o r t i n g i t or being mislead by i t . Point ( i i i ) 
declares that understanding ordinary language w i l l 
give us a sharper awareness of d i s t inc t ion^^ . in the 
phenomena we use the words to t a l k about . ' 
Another area in which Aust in made c ruc ia l con t r ibu t ion 
i s the domain of those u t te rances which c o n s t i t u t e some 
act ions. The^e utterances, u t t e r i n g which is tantamount to 
the performance of ce r ta in ac t ions , were ca l led by Austin as 
p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s . The i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t hese 
utterances led Aust in to the study of d i f f e r e n t aspects of 
a l l u t te rances , t h a t i s , the speech-ac ts t h a t language i s 
const i tu ted o f . And since these would be meaningful only i f 
we understand the ro le and behaviour o f communicators and 
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interlocutors, when they engage in a communicative act, 
Austin proceeded to study the total phenomenon of 
communication as such. 
Austin's collection of lectures, 'How to do things with 
words, is largely devoted to a three-fold taxonomy, in which 
"to say something is to do something". To utter a sentence 
with a certain sense and reference is to perform a 
'locutionary act'; and to do this with a certain force, is to 
perform an 'illocutionary act'; and finally to achieve the 
response, is to perform a 'perlocutionary act'. 
Austin contends that the basic unit of study for 
philosophers should be, not only the word or the sentence, 
but the act which a person performs with the aid of sentences 
and words, because a word or a sentence tells us little 
about what the sentence or word is being used to say, so the 
total act of speech performed by the speaker with the aid of 
sentence is what needs to be explained. 
Austin developed a taxonomy of speech-acts. First the 
'locutionary act' which has 'meaning" and secondly the 
'illocutionary act', which has a certain force, in saying 
something and finally the 'perlocutionary act' which achieves 
certain effect by being performed or said. All these acts lie 
within the context of human communication. The distinctions 
between these three acts, locutionary, illocutionary and 
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per locut ionary col lapse at the end, and we discover that 
a n utterances are in a sense per format ive. 
Later on A u s t i n ' s f o l l o w e r , John S e a r l e , took h i s 
speech-acts as paradigms f o r h i s f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s o f the 
theory . He thought A u s t i n ' s speech ac t s are the paradigm 
speech acts of communication. 
To quote Searle , 
I h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t speak ing a language i s 
engaging in a ru le governed form of behaviour . . . 
The form that t h i s hypothesis w i l l take is tha t 
speaking a language is performing speech-acts, acts 
such as making statements, g iv ing commands, asking 
ques t ions , making promises, and so on ; and more 
abs t rac t l y , acts such as r e fe r r i ng and p red ica t ing ; 
and secondly, t ha t these acts are in general made 
possible by and are performed in accordance wi th 
c e r t a i n fy-Jes f o r the use o f l i n g u i s t i c 
elements .• ' 
S e a r l e b e l i e v e s t h a t t he purpose o f language i s 
communication and the u n i t of human communication in language 
is the speech act . He re jec ts the t r a d i t i o n a l concept that 
the basic un i t of l i n g u i s t i c communication is the symbol, 
the word or sentence and fo l low ing Aust in argues that the 
production or the issuance of a sentence in the performance 
of the speech act is the proper un i t of communication. The 
problem of the theory of language i s t o desc r i be how we 
proceed f rom the p h o n e t i c a c t s (sounds or n o i s e s ) t o 
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the illocutionary acts (commands or statements) and what 
have to be the sounds or noises we must utter in order to 
issue a performative utterance or the speech act of asking a 
question, making a statement, or commanding etc. The rules of 
language according to Searle enable us to proceed from 
phonetic acts to the performance of illocutionary acts of 
human communication. 
Thus in a sense, the study of speech acts, seems to 
be fundamental to any understanding of language. The basic 
unit of linguistic communication is not an expression, word 
or a sentence considered as a syntactic or semantic entity, 
but the definite issuance of an utterance in the performance 
of a public speech-act. All linguistic communication 
neccessarily involves such speech-acts. We have no choice, 
according to Searle, in order to understand language, but to 
undertake the careful and serious study of the particular 
sort of 'doing', which is 'speaking', intotolabelled as the 
"speech act". 
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P a r t - I 
S igni f icance of Performative utterances 
(a) Constat ive Vs performative utterances 
P r i o r t o h i s manoeuvre o f a n a l y z i n g p e r f o r m a t i v e 
utterances, Aust in po ints out tha t philosophers of language 
had assumed tha t the sole business of an utterance was to be 
e i t h e r t r ue or f a l s e . These ph i l osophe rs had most ly been 
in terested in utterances which report f ac t s or which describe 
s i tua t ions t r u l y or f a l s e l y . The fo l lowers of t h i s theory, 
during 1920's and 30's were grouped as log ica l p o s i t i v i s t s . 
Under t he i n f l u e n c e o f W i t t g e n s t e i n , e s p e i c a l l y h i s 
Tractatus. they developed a c r i t e r i o n of meaningfulness, 
c a l l e d the v e r i f i c a t i o n p r i n c i p l e ' . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e the meaning of a p r o p o s i t i o n i s i t s method o f 
v e r i f i c a t i o n , and a l l meaningful s ta tements are e i t h e r 
a n a l y t i c or s y n t h e t i c . A l l a n a l y t i c t r u t h s are t r u e by 
def in i t ion,whereas a l l t rue synthet ic or empir ical statements 
are t rue in v i r t u e of the sense experineces, which ve r i f y 
them. Later t h i s kind of approach came to be questioned on 
several grounds. One of the most decis ive arguments against 
i t was the s o r t forwarded by Sear le and o t h e r s . This 
argument centres around the s t a t u s of the v e r i f i c a t i o n 
p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f . As S e a r l e a r g u e s , t he v e r i f i c a t i o n 
p r i nc ip le i t s e l f i s ,not syn the t i c , f o r v e r i f i a b i 1 i t y cannot 
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be just a contingent empirical trait of meaningful 
utterances. Nor can this principle be analytic, since it is 
not an arbitrary definition of meaningfulness, which one may 
or may not choose to accept. The logical consequence of this 
line of argument is that it leads to a strong doubt about the 
meaningfulness of the verification principle itself. 
What is pertinent in the present context, however, is 
the fact that on the whole, logical positivists, the early 
Wittigenstein, Frege and some other philosophers shared 
certain common assumptions with regard to the nature of 
propositions. All of them stressed the cognitive aspect of a 
proposition. To them the aim of language was to communicate 
what can be factually true or false. They treated the 
elements of language - sentences and propositions - as things 
that are true or false apart from any actions or intentions* 
of the speakers or the hears. Thus they stressed the 
structural aspect of language, at the cost of the 
performative or the intentional aspect. After the second 
World War these assumptions came to be vigorously challenged 
particularly by Wittigensten. This was the move towards the 
* Searlg stressed the intentionality whereas Austin 
stressed the action. 
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'use theory of meaning'. Wittigenstein thought that for a 
large class of sentences or propositions the meaning of a 
word is its use. In a similar fashion, Austin attempted to 
investigate a class of utterances that do not even set out to 
be true or false. He stressed the actions and intentions of 
the speakers or hearers, that is the performative aspect of 
language. Fox example, if I say, "I promise to do it" here 
this sentence does not attempt to state a fact about any 
promising, but its utterance constitutes making a promise -
performing an act of promising: Austin called such utterances 
'performatives', contrasting them with 'constatives'.Austin's 
concern remained to examine the utterances, grammatically 
classed as statements and yet not non-sensical and also 
neither true nor false. Verification theory suggested that 
those statements which are unverifiable are pseudo-
statements. But the question according to Austin, remained 
whether many apparent pseudo-statements really set out to be 
'statements' at all. Many utterances which look like 
statements are either not intended at all or only intended in 
part, to impart information about the facts - we often use 
utterances in ways not covered by traditional grammer. Many 
especially perplexing words errjedded in descriptive statements 
do not serve to indicate some additional peculiar features 
of the reality reported, but to indicate the circumstances 
in which the statement is made or the way in which it is to 
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be taken. To overlook these possibilities in this way, once 
common, is called the 'descriptive fallacy'. But Austin 
thinks that the descriptive itself is only one among several 
possible types of statements, and all true and false 
statements are not descriptive. So he prefers to use the word 
'constative' instead of descriptive statements. Austin 
believes that the traditional philosophical perplexities and 
puzzlements have arisen out of a mistake - "the mistake of 
taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which 
are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical 
or else intended as something quite different".^^' 
Austin's initial distinction was between 'constatives' 
and 'performatives'. A constative is an utterance, which 
roughly speaking, serves to state a fact, report that 
something is the case or describe what something is. 
Performatives on the other hand, are the utterances that have 
the following characteristics:-
they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate 
anything at all, are not 'true or false'; and 
B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, 
the doing of an action, which again would, not 
normally be described as saying something.^^^ 
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This distinction was based on the difference between 
'saying' as such and doing something through saying - such as 
promising, betting, issuing warnings etc. The utterances 
which are not acts are constatives and the utterances which 
constitute acts are performatives. The constative utterance 
has the property of being true or false but the 
performatives, in contrast can never be true or false just as 
any action cannot be true or false. For example expressions 
like "true, promise", "true apology" are semantically 
ambiguous. They have no sense corresponding to the sense of 
"true statement" but have only a sense in which true means 
"sincere". 
R.A. Lanigan distinguishes between Austin's 
'constatives' and 'performatives' in terms of structure and 
content. He says: 
Speech acts contain what I would like to call 
'structure' in that they display various types of 
semiotic relationships which are themselves 
definitive, i.e. descriptive, of what they are in 
fact. Some of these semiotic relationships are 
overtly contained in the sentences (or words that 
make up the sentences) as uttered by a speaker, and 
as such can be labeled a speech act structure. 
Typical relations that specify such a structure are 
those studied by Austin in the first iris.tance, 
namely, 'constatives' and 'performatives'.^ ' 
The 'constative' is a well-known coinage of Austin, 
alongwith 'performative' but this is not a vague or trivial 
delineation. The, constatives and performatives appear to be 
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two types of a class or rather two species of the same genus 
of utterance. The basic criterion for distinguishing the 
types has been the nature of the 'constative', since it 
carries with it the available test of confirmation or denial 
with an objective reference to a state of affairs. As R.L. 
Lanigan says; 
. . . . theorists are left with speculations about 
the nature of the thing and application of the term 
of performatives as unknown,or ambiguous by 
comparison with the constati ve / ^ 
Again Lanigan asks whether this type of optimism about the 
stability and reliability of the definition of constatives is 
is found 
justified. The answer to this question/ in an understanding 
of the nature of a statement. A statement, according to 
Lanigan, is an utterance which asserts the truth of a state 
of affairs. The truth or falsity of the assertion, ascription 
or reference can be determined by comparing the utterance to 
the original person, event or activity talked about. The role 
of a constative utterance seems to be to function as an 
expression of a state of affairs which contrasts with the 
function of a performative which is to bring about a state of 
affairs. According to Lanigan, Austin tries to locate this 
functional difference in its association with a grammatical 
distinction to be found in sentence forms and their uses. 
21 
Austin, however, was more interested in the 
'performatives' rather than the 'constatives'. Indeed, it was 
the concept of 'performative' on which his speech act theory 
seems to be based. Now let us consider why exactly Austin 
found the concept of 'performative' so interesting. Austin 
thinks that recognition of some cases and senses, in which 
"to say something is to do something" is one development in 
the movement away from the age-old supposition in 
philosophy, that in at least the cases worth considering, to 
say something is always to state something. But how radical 
is this distinction and how far does it rectify this 
supposition? 
Austin maintained that the performative nature of a 
certain class of utterances compels us to revise the whole 
traditional taxonomy of statements and propositions. 
Austin gives the following examples of performative 
utterances:-
(E.a) 'I do (Sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded 
wife)' - as uttered in the course of the marriage 
ceremony. 
(E.b) 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' - as uttered 
when smashing the bottle against the stem. 
(E.c) 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother' - as 
occurring in a wil 1. 
(E.d) 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.•• 
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It is clear that in all these cases in uttering these 
sentences the speakers are performing certain actions and 
not referring to or reporting on those actions. The point to 
be noted, however, is that here performance is inextricably 
involved in the total situation of the utterance. That is, 
the performance must be issued in a situation appropriate 
in all respects for that particular act. For instance, in 
the appropriate circumstances, a suitable person, uttering 
the words, "I name ....", does not mean to report the 
ceremony, but to performing it. If the speaker is not 
suitable in the conditions required for its performance, 
then generally his utterance will be 'infelicitious' or 
'unhappy'. Thus for naming the ship it is essential that one 
should be the person appointed to name the ship, that he 
should have been entitled to name a particular ship. If the 
wrong person issues the utterance, or the right person issues 
the utterance at the wrong ship, then 'the naming of the 
ship' is not done. Or for marrying, it is essential for a 
christian that he is not already married, with wife living, 
sane or undivorced. Similarly for the act of betting, it is 
equally necessary, that the bet is acceptable to the taker, 
who must have said or uttered the word 'Done', involving an 
action. Austin of course concedes that an action can be 
performed in ways other than by a performative utterance as, 
for instance, through a 'gesture, provided that the 
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circumstances are apiaropriate. This proviso is very important 
because if the situation is inappropriate that utterance as 
such would be trivial or vacuous. As Austin says, if, for 
example, I say 'I gift this to you' and do not hand it over, 
it is hardly a gift. In any case, as Austin points the terms 
'true' and 'false' are not appropriate for performative 
utterances at all. It is only loosely that we call a promise 
a 'false' promise. As a matter of fact 'the promise' is 
'void' or given in bad-faith. So we are mistaken in imagining 
that the truth of an utterance consists in its being 
uttered as merely the outward and visible sign, for 
convenience and information, of an inward spiritual act: and 
equally mistaken is our belief that the outward utterance is 
a description, true or false, of the occurance of the inward 
performance. But in all cases of utterances e.g. 'I bet' or 1 
promi se' whether sincere or insincere, accurate or 
inaccurate, is certainly to perform the act of 'promising' 
or 'betting'. As Austin says, the old saying that 'our word 
is our bond' describes the logic of performative utterance 
much more aptly than one would imagine. 
However, there is one important point to be made here. 
We tend to think that one of the appropriate circumstances 
necessary for an utterance to be true is that the speaker 
'Should have meant it seriously. For instance, the utterance 
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should not have been made as a joke or should not have been 
part of a poem. But, to Austin, from this quite proper 
assumption we are likely to derive a totally mistaken 
inference to the effect that the utterance is true only in so 
far as it reflects or is an outward expression of inner 
intention or attitude. We are likely to feel that a promise 
not intended seriously is not a promise. Austin points out 
that this inference is wrong. The status of the utterance in 
no way depends on its supposed correspondence to an inward 
state. My saying 'I promise X' makes it a promise regardless 
of whether at that moment I intended it as a sincere promise 
or not. So Austin, settles for the words 'happy' and 
'unhappy' or 'felicitious' and 'infelicitous' to describe 
performatives in general. 
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(b) Felicity Vs Infelicity of utterances 
Austin specifies three kinds of infelicities associated 
with the performatives: These are nullity^ insincerity and 
breach of commitment. But he points out that even if a 
complete classification of these infelicities is possible, 
they may not be sharply distinguishable and different kinds 
of infelicities may always overlap, that is a particular case 
of infelicity may be classified under more than one heading. 
And since a performative is both an act i on and an 
utterance, it may be liable to be substandard in all the 
ways in which generally actions can be, as well as in 
ways in which utterances can be. Take for example the 
issuance of a performative under duress or by an accident. 
The issuance of a performative utterance e.g. 'I promise to 
...', uttered under duress is felicitious, but considering 
the actions involved with it, the utterance is 
infelicitious, on the other hand sometimes, leaving aside 
the situation in which the utterance is performed, the 
utterance may be misunderstood due to defective gramm r, or 
because it is uttered as a dialogue in a play. In these 
cases the utterance may be infelicitious. But Austin does not 
discuss this type of infelicities at large. A performative 
utterance may be "null and void", if for instance the speaker 
is not in a position or has no authority to'perform such an 
26 
act e.g., the speaker is not the person authorized to 
perform the act of naming a ship. Or if the object by means 
of which he has to perform it is not suitable for the 
purpose, e.g. while naming a ship one cannot use a ribbon 
instead of a bottle to strike. Then simply issuing an 
utterance does not amount to carrying out the purported, 
act. Thus, in a christian society a man does not get married 
a second time, he only goes through a form of second 
marriage: for example, one can't name a ship, unless he has 
some authority to name it. Therefore, uttering the words, "I 
name this ship 'liberte', in such a case does not constitute 
the purported speech act. The speech act here is "null and 
A performative utterance may be infelicitous due to 
insincerity, though it may not be void or null. Let us take 
the example of 'I promise' or 'I apologise', if someone says, 
'I promise to' and at the same time, hardly intends to carry 
out the promised action - the performer is intentionally 
insincere. And indeed he, himself may not believe that he has 
the authority to carry out the action, in which case the 
promise may be void. For e.g., if I say, 'I appoint you or 
promise to appoint you a judge of the supreme court' it is 
void because I cannot in any case fulfill the promise. 
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Thirdly, our performative utterance may be 
infelicitous, due to the violation of the purported act, 
which Austin calls, "breach of commitment". Supposing, our 
performative utterance has been issued quite normally and 
apparently sincerely, the performative utterance would be 
considered characteristically to have taken effect. Here the 
effect is not to be considered to be the cause of the prior 
act, but the future event will be in order and the utterance 
e.g. "I promise" will be felicitious. But for example, if 
someone says, 'I welcome you' which is a performative 
utterance, the act will not be in order, if he proceeds to 
treat the visitor as an enemy or an intruder, instead of 
showing hospitality. Thus even if the performative has taken 
effect, there is always a possibility of a third kind of 
infelicity, which is the, breach of commitment. 
Austin believes that performative acts are conventional 
acts , for example in law and in games and many other cases, 
we follow certain rules by a convention. In some cases, 
following the relevant conventions usually consists of and 
includes uttering of certain words. In these cases one who 
issues the relevant utterance, in appropriate circumstances, 
not merely says something, but by a convention does 
something, that is he performs the act of doing, while 
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saying something e.g. conventionally one cannot say 'I 
baptize this dog'. 
Besides uttering the words of so called performative, 
we have to follow some general rules if we are said to have 
happily brought-off our action. Here Austin classifies the 
types of cases in which something goes wrong and the acts of 
-"marrying, betting, bequeathing, cristening", etc. - end up 
in failure. In such cases utterances are not false but in 
general unhappy or infelicitious. And this doctrine of "the 
things that can be and do go wrong" is called the doctrine of 
"infelicities". 
For avoiding "fre infelicity of performative utterances 
Austin gives six rules, the violation of any of which can 
create an infelicity of performatives. These six rules are:-
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure 
having a certain conventional effect, that procedure 
to include the uttering of certain words by certain 
persons in certain circumstances, and further, 
(A.2) The particular persons and circumstances in a given 
case must be appropriate for the invocation of the 
particular procedure invoked. 
(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants 
both correctly and 
(B.2) completely. 
(T*. 1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use 
by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or 
for the inauguration of certain consequential 
conduct on the part of any participant', then a 
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person participating in and so invoking the 
procedure must in fact have those thoughts or 
feelings, and the participants must intend so to 
conduct themselves, and further 
("T.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. •^' 
Austin tries to analyze the applicability of these 
rules of infelicity in accordance with each other, of which 
four are such as to make the utterance misfire by their 
violation. Firstly he distinguishes A and B rules taken 
together, secondly he distinguishes these as opposed to the 
two rules V.^ andP.2. Thus, according to Austin; 
If we offend against any of the former rules (A's 
or B's) - that is if we, say, utter the formula 
incorrectly, or if, say, we are not in a position 
to do the act because we are, say, married already, 
or it is the purser and not the captain who is 
conducting the ceremony, then the act in question, 
e.g. marrying, is not successfully performed at 
all, does not come off, is not achieved. Whereas in 
in the two T" cases the act is achieved, although to 
achieve it in such circumstances, as when we are, 
say, insincere, is an abuse of the procedure. Thus, 
when I say 'I promise' and I have no intention of 
keeping it, I have promised but ... We need names 
for referring to this general distinction, so we 
shall call in general those infelicities A.1 - B.2 
which are such that the act for the performing of 
which, and in the performing of which, the verbal 
formula in question is designed, is not achieved, 
by the name MISFIRES: and on the other hand we 
may christen those infelicities where the act is 
achieved ABUSES (do not stress the normal 
connotations of these names 1) when the utterance 
is a misfire, the procedure which we purport to 
invoke is disallowed or is botched: and our act 
(marrying, ^c,) is void or without effect, & 
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This hard ly means tha t we have not done a n y t h i n g . 
Though the utterance may be vo id , l o t s of th ings w i l l have 
been done - but we w i l l not have done a meaningful act . By 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g among the sets o f r u l e s o f i n f e l i c i t y as 
opposed to each other, Austin introduces a scheme which he 
l a t e r develops i n t o a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of i n f e l i c i t i e s . We 
have a c l e a r - c u t d i s t i n c t i o n between the s i x r u l e s . The 
scheme is as fo l l ows : 
AB 
Misfires 
Act purported 
Missinvocations 
Act disallowed 
A.1 
Infelicities 
but void 
Misexecutions 
Act vitiated 
/ 
A.2 
Misapplication 
B.I 
Flaws 
Abuses 
Act professed 
Insincereties 
B.2 
Hitches (12) 
but holl-« 
As regards the extent and variety of 'acts' which are 
subject to 'infelicity', Austin maintains that infelicity is 
an ill to which all acts are heir. The performatives have a 
general character of the ceremonial like all conventional 
acts. However, not every ritual is liable to every form of 
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infelicity, nor is every performative utterance. But in so 
far as the utterances used in the law are the acts of law, 
and the acts which fall within the province of i2.thics are not 
simply physical movements but are acts, many of which have a 
general character of conventional or ritual acts, all these 
are exposed to infelicity, G.J. Warnock agrees with Austin's 
view of performative utterances as those which by convention 
constitute doing, something, and which by the same 
connections are subject to infelicity. 
He says: 
For if it is to be by convention that to say X 
constitutes doing Y, it will be illuminating to 
consider why, and in how many sorts of ways, 
saying X sometimes doesn't quite, or even at all, 
amount to doing Y - why, and in how many sorts of 
ways, the purported doing may not happily 'come 
off. What is involved in doing it properly will be 
illuminated by considering how things may go wrong. 
For of course, in these cases, doing is never just 
saying:it is saying 'happily' - saying, that is, in 
the absence of the sorts of things that Austin 
called misfires and abuses - misapplications, 
flaws, hitches, insincerities, and what not. Where 
there is a convention that to do (e.g. say) X 
counts as Y, y will only actually get done if X is 
done (e.g. said) by the right person, at the right 
time and place, in the right way, and so on.'^^' 
Now the question arises, whether the notion of 
infelicity applies to the utterances which are statements as 
well? Austin thinks that statements can be 'outrageous', e.g. 
'the present king of France is bald', which refers to 
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something which does not exist. But it would be very 
misleading to say that statements are liable to 'infelicity' 
as such. Therefore, as already pointed out, constatives or 
descriptive statements, can be true or false, whereas 
performatives can be felicitous or infelicitious. 
Thus Austin claims that infelicity applies to all 
performative acts, which by convention are ceremonial acts 
and not merely verbal ones. 
However, Austin admits that our list of infelicities is 
not complete, because actions in general are liable to 
them, e.g., those done under duress or by accident or 
unintentionally. As utterances our performatives also are 
liable to other kinds of ill which infect all utterances, 
e.g., a performtive utterance may be void, if said by an 
actor on a stage, which applies to all uterances. Also that a 
'performative' e.g., 'I promise' should have been heard by 
the promisee and should have been well understood by him as 
promising and not merely joking. And if one or the other 
conditions are not fulfilled, doubts can arise whether I have 
really promised or only attempted to promise. 
Thirdly, Austin asks whether these classes of 
infelicity are mutually exclusive. Here again he admits that 
these are not exlusive in the sense that we can go wrong in 
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two ways at once, e.g., we can insincerely promise a donkey 
to give it a carrot. More importantly, the ways of going 
wrong overlap. For example, I see a vessel on the stocks, and 
approach to smash the bottle hung at the stem, proclaim 'I 
name this ship Mr. Stalin' and kick away the cocks: but I 
was not the person chosen to name it or may be perhaps it was 
Mr. Stalin only destined to name it, in such a case we all 
agree that the ship was not thereby named; but I went through 
a form of naming the vessel. 
Thus according to Austin, different infelicities can 
overlap and that it can be more or less an optional matter 
how we classify some particular example. Therefore, Austin 
next proceeds to the infelicities created out of the 
infringement of the six rules of infelicity already 
discussed. 
Austin begins by recalling the first two of the six 
rules he had formulated, which say 
(A.1) that there must exist an accepted conventional 
procedure having a certain conventional effect, 
that procedure to include the uttering of certain 
words by certain persons in certain circumstances; 
and rule A.2 ... that the particular persons and 
circumstances in a given case must be appropriate 
for the invocation of the particular procedure 
invoked. ^ "^^ ^ 
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According to Austin, the rule A.1 contains two words 
'exist' and 'accepted' which need attention. If a 
performative utterance is classed as a misfire because the 
invoked procedure is 'not accepted', it is presumably persons 
other than the speaker who do not accept it. Take the 
example, 'I divorce you', said to a wife by her husband (in 
a Christian context). Here the utterance is a misfire because 
there is no procedure at all for effecting divorce. We may 
never admit any 'such' procedure for doing a particular 
thing. But equally there are possibilities of accepting a 
procedure in certain circumstances but not in any other 
circumstances or situations. So, here we may often be in 
doubt - e.g., in the naming of a thing - whether an 
infelicity should be brought into the class A.I, or into the 
class A.2. For example, Austin says: 
On a desert island you may say to me 'Go and pick 
up wood': and I may say 'I don't take orders from 
you' or you are not entitled to give me orders' -
I do not take orders from you when you try to 
'assert your authority' (which I might fall in with 
but may not) on a desert island, as apposed to the 
case when you are the captain PJ\\^ ship and 
therefore genuinely have authority.^ 
Now bringing the case under A.2, the procedure uttering 
certain words may be acceptable but the circumstances in 
which it is to be Invoked, or the persons who invoked it may 
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be wrong: For example, a command is in orxler only when the 
subject of the verb is an authority. 
Or again Austin brings the case under the rule B.2. The 
procedure has not been completely executed; because it is 
essential that the person to be the subject of the verb or 
the performer, e.g., 'I order to' should by some previous 
procedure, have been constituted the person who is to do the 
ordering or has been given an authority, e.g., by saying, 'I 
promise to do what you order me to do'. 
Secondly Austin explains what is meant by the suggestion 
that sometimes a procedure may not even 'exist' as distinct 
from 'accepted'. There are cases of procedures which 'no 
longer exist', e.g. take the case of 'challenging', which 
in olden societies was generally accepted as rule for 
duelling. That is the utterance 'my seconds will call on you' 
could be treated equivalent to 'I challenge you' in 
duelling. But in present societies the procedure does not 
exist and therefore not accepted. Also we have the case of 
procedures which someone is initiating. For example, in the 
game of football the person who first picked up the ball and 
ran-away, did initiate another game, came to be accepted as 
a game or the student duelling in Germany in the hey-day, 
the accepted procedure would be that the members of one club 
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to march past members of a rival club, each drawn up in file, 
and then for each to say to his chosen opponent as he 
passed, very politely, 'I insult you'. But in normal 
circumstances if we proceed to say; I insult you' instead 
of persuing the act of saying 'you are a coward' or 'you 
are ugly' which is an insult, does arise misinvocations. 
The procedure in that sense is merely a verbal one, for 
insulting is a conventional procedure. 
Austin assumes that it is inherent in the nature of 
any procedure that the limits of its applicability are 
imprecise and the definition of the procedure vague. There 
will always occur difficult cases where nothing in the 
previous history of a conventional procedure will decide 
conclusively, whether such a procedure is or is not correctly 
applied to such a case. For example, Austin says. 
Can I baptize a dog, if it is admittedly rational? 
Or should I be non-played? The law abounds in such 
difficult decisions - in which, of course, it 
becomes more or less arbitrary whether we regard 
our selves as deciding (A.1) that a convention does 
not exist or as deciding (A.2) that the 
circumstances are not appropriate for the 
invocation of a convention which undoubtedly does 
exist: either way, we shall tend to be bound by the 
'precedent' we set.^'^-
The performative utterances which Austin takes as 
paradigm cases or conventional cases are as he calls them. 
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highly developed affairs - i.e., 'explicit peformatives'. We 
need to use the explicit performatives in order to decide 
whether or not the utterance is a performative. To decide the 
utterance in either way, the procedure in question, is 
explicitly or implicitly invoked, putting an utterance on a 
test, whether it is performative or not. We make use of an 
asymmetry, in the case of what is called 'explicit 
performative' verb, between the first person singular of the 
present indicative active and other persons and tenses of 
the same verb. For example, 'I promise' is an explicit 
performative which is used to perform the act of promising; 
and on the other hand 'I promised' or 'he promises' are the 
expressions which simply describe or report an act of 
promising, Austin did not claim it necessary for a 
performative to be expressed in one of these forms, but used 
them to contrast 'performatives' from the 'constatives'. 
Let us now explain the infringement of the rule A.2; 
which Austin call 'Misaplications': 
A.2. The particular persons and circumstances in a 
given case must be appropriate for the. invocation 
of the particular procedure invoked . • '^  
Here Austin gives us an example of a performative 
utterance, 'I appoint you'. It may be that the person has 
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already been appointed or already someone else has been 
appointed or I am not entitled to appoint that person or the 
person in question is other than the person who is in need of 
a job. So here we have different types of inappropriateness. 
But the point is that, we need to distinguish not between 
the 'inappropriate persons' and 'inappropriate 
circumstances', but between the cases where the 
unappropriateness of persons, objects, names etc., is a 
matter of 'incapacity' and simpler cases where the object or 
performer is of the wrong type. For example, in the words of 
Austin, 
we must distinguish the cases of a clergyman 
baptizing the wrong baby with the right name or 
baptizing a baby 'Albert' instead of 'Alfred", from 
those of saying 'I baptize this infant 2704' or 'I 
promise I will bash your face in' or appointing a 
horse as Consul. In the latter cases there is 
something of the wrong kind or type included, 
whereas in the others the inappropriateness is only 
a matter of incapacity .*'°' 
Next Austin discuses B.1 and 8.2, called 
'Misexecutions'. "B.1 The procedure must be executed by all 
participants correctly . These are flaws. They consist in the 
use of, for example, wrong fomul as - there is a procedure 
which is appropriate to the persons and the circumstances, 
but it is not gone through correctly.-^^ 
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These Austin calls inexplicit formulas - vague formulas 
and uncertain references. For example, if we say, 'my house' 
when I have more than one or if say, 'I bet you the race 
won't be run today' when more than one race was already 
organised. 
B.2. The procedure must be executed by all 
participants completely .^^O) 
These are 'hitches' resulting from some of the parties 
involved in the act not carrying out their part of the 
procedure. We may attempt to carry out the procedure but the 
act is abortive. For example, someone attempts to make a bet 
by saying 'I bet you six pence', but it would be abortive 
unless the hearer accepts the bet by saying 'I take you on'. 
Again, if someone attempts ceremonially to open a library, 
the act is abortive if he says 'I open this library' but the 
key snaps in the lock; conversely the christening of a ship 
is abortive if one kicks away thechocks before uttering 'I 
launch this ship'. Here again, in our ordinary life a 
certain flexibility in procedure is permitted, but the 
principle remains the same. In formal cases, some reciprocal 
gesture is expected by the party at the receiving end of a 
ceremonial act. Uncertainities arise if, for instance an 
appointment is made without the consent of the person 
appointed. Here the question arises as to how far acts can 
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be unilateral the act is complete, or incomplete, or what 
counts as its completion. 
Though Austin invokes further dimensions of infelicity, 
he rejects them. These involve possibilities of the performer 
making a simple mistake of fact or of disagreements over the 
matters of fact, which can create further dimensions of 
infelicity. Austin's analysis of infelicity in terms of 
infringement of the rules of performative acts is basically 
to show how attendant conditions can in various ways make 
performatives go array. 
Austin admits that in handling performatives it seems 
as if the only thing that a performative utterance Kftd to do 
was to be felicitious, and not to be a misfire or an 
abuse. But the matter cannot end here and the utterances we 
have classed as performatives e.g.; 'I warn you to' 'I advise 
you to' etc will be further subject to questions such as, was 
it in order, was it good or sound advice? Was it a justified 
warning? These questions Austin says, can only be decided by 
how the content of warning or advice is related in some way 
to fact or to evidence available about the facts. So one 
can assert here that we need to assess at least a great many 
performatives in a general dimension of corespondence with 
facts. Still we may say that performatives are unlike 
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statements because they are not true or false. Moreover, when 
truth and falsity are taken seriously, it seems that very 
few statements that we ever utter are just true or just 
false. Usually they are liable to questions such as whether 
they are fair or not, adequate or not adequate, exaggerated 
or not exaggerated and so on? 'True' and 'false' according 
to Austin are general labels for a whole dimension of 
different appraisals which have something or other to do with 
the relation between uterances and facts. Again if we do not 
stress truth and falsity, we find that statements when 
assessed in relation to the facts are not very different 
from performatives like advice, warnings, and so on. 
Thus stating something is performing an act just as 
much as is giving an order or a warning, and on the other 
hand, when we give an order or warning, there is a question 
about how this is related to the fact, which is not perhaps 
so very different from the kind of question that arises when 
we discuss how a statement is related to fact. Therefore, 
Austin's distinction between the constatives and 
performatives, in its original form consideriably collapses. 
J.R. Searle Says: 
Making a statement or giving a description is as 
much performing a speech act as making a promise or 
giving an order. So what were originally presented 
as special cases of utterances (performatives) now 
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are seen to swallow the general oases 
fconstat!ves), which turn out to be only one class 
of speech actJamong others.•• 
Thus making a statement or giving a description is as 
much performing an act, as making a promise. The original 
distinction between the statements or descriptions and the 
utterances which are acts of performatives, also collapses 
due to the true/false theory of utterances or expressions, 
with the later developments. It seems evident that the 
performatives also can be liable and assessed as true and 
false, whereas constatives can be assessed as felicitious and 
infelicitious. 
Searle points out that "Austin's distinction of 
"felicitous" and "infelicitous" speech act fails to 
distinguish between those speech acts which are successful 
but defective and those which are not even successful".-^^ 
For example if someone says, *I hereby excommunicate you', 
the speech act will be absolutely unsuccessful, unless 
various conditions for it to be successful are not fulfilled. 
On the other hand if someone makes a statement for which he 
or she has no sufficient warrant or evidence, he or she might 
succeed in making a statement, however, it would be defective 
because of lack of evidence. Such a type of speech act is 
successful but defective. An ideal speech act is both 
successful and non-defective. 
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Part-II 
LOCUTIONARY, ILLOCUTIONARY AND PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS 
In our exposition of Austin's constative/performative 
distinction, we found that the distinction collapses at the 
end, surviving only with the proviso that constatives also 
can be as much speech acts as the performatives. 
The constatives turn out to have dimensions similar to 
those of felicity and infelicity, whereas many performatives 
can be assessed in a dimension of correspondence with facts, 
though initially Austin starts with its converse - i.e. the 
performatives can be felicitous or infelicitous and 
constatives can be true or false. While dealing with the 
constatives—performative distinction it seems that the 
constatives too are not distinct from warnings, advices, or 
verdicts and so on. A statement related to the constative 
utterance, e.g. 'John is running', is the statement 'I am 
stating that John is running' which may depend for its truth 
value on the truth of 'John is running'. Just as the truth 
value of 'I assert that I am apologizing' depends on the 
felicity of 'I apologize'. On the other hand, take for 
instance the performative utterance, 'I warn you that the 
bull is about to charge*. If it'^ is the case that the bull is 
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not about to charge (and the person u t t e r i n g the sentence did 
not know tha t the bu l l i s about to charge),t we cannot say 
that the warning was void or ins incere or has any type of 
i n f e l i c i t y ( i n the Aust in ian sense), but we are inc l ined to 
say tha t the warning was fa l se or mistaken. Our discussion 
of the d i s t i n c t i o n of c o n s t a t i v e s and p e r f o r m a t i v e s a l so 
suggests tha t both the acts or the type of utterances are 
analogously t i e d to the whole s i t u a t i o n in which they are 
u t t e r e d . Thus the presumed f i e l d o f p e r f o r m a t i v e s and 
constat ives turns out to be the par t of the domain of speech 
acts* 
* But t h e h i s t o r i c a l f a c t i s t h a t t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e -
constat ive dest inc t ion has become a par t of phi losophical 
vocabulary.Walter Cerf, in h is c r i t i c a l review of HOW TO 
DO THINGS WITH WORDS compares t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e -
constat ive d i s t i n c t i o n w i th the c lass i ca l hallmarks in 
a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p y , such s R y l e ' s ' g h o s t i n t h e 
machine' and the 'Language games' of Wi t t i gens te in , as 
wel l as Kant's ana ly t i c and s2>nthet ic Judgements. Though 
A u s t i n h i m s e l f came t o be q u i t e c r i t i c a l o f h i s 
p e r f o r m a t i v e - c o n s t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n , ye t t he 
d i s t i n c t i o n continued to enjoy an important place in the 
subsequent phi losophical l i t e r a t u r e . 
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Austin in his lectures HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, 
initially developed the speech act theory centering around 
the distinction between performatives and constatives. In 
this distinction Austin highlights the performative 
utterances and finds a way to develop explicit performatives 
from the primary performatives, Austin feels it fair to say 
that in the evolution of language, the explicit 
performatives are later developments in the history of 
language, e.g. 'I will ' is more primitive then 'I 
promise that I will ....' Therefore, he feels it necessary 
to embark on the list of explicit performative verbs - which 
have force. However, in engaging ourselves in the programme of 
finding a list of explicit performative verbs, we find that, 
it is difficult to distinguish performatives from constative 
verbs. Thus it seems expedient to go back to consider how 
many senses there are in which to say something is to do 
something or in saying something we do something or even by 
saying something we do something.. Thus we find that in the 
theory of speech acts propounded in the lectures VIII to XII 
of HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, the land of speech acts has 
been divided into three provinces, locutionary, i1locutionary 
and the perlocutionary acts. Let us examine these provinces 
one by one. 
46 
LOCUTIONARY ACT: 
In the process of developing the speech act theory in 
terms of locutionary, i1locutionary and perlocutionary 
components of speech acts, Austin reconsiders more generally 
the basic senses in which to say something may be to do 
something, or 'in saying something we do something': issuing 
an utterance is to perform an action, but here certainly the 
word 'action' involves a confusion. As Austin says. 
We may contrast men of words with men of action, 
we may say they did nothing, oaly talked or said 
things: yet again, we may contrast only thinking 
something with actually saying it (out. loud), in 
which context saying is doing something. ^ "^ 
Again, Austin deals with the circumstances and 
situations of 'issuing an utterance' -the different senses in 
which to 'say something is actually to do something'. The 
whole group of senses he labels as A,B, and C senses - in 
which to utter, assert or say something must always be to do 
something - this group of senses which together makes a 
'saying', or a complete speech act are also called 
locutionary, i 11 ocutionary and perlocutionary acts 
respectively. But how many senses are there in which 'to say 
something is necessarily to do something? Are these senses 
such as 'of saying something we do something' or 'in saying 
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something we do something' or 'by saying something we do 
something'? 
Arguably in a communicative situation what counts as a 
speech act or what the nature of an individual utterance is, 
would be difficult to define. The sheer act of utterance as 
such Austin calls the locutionary act. To quote Austin, the 
locutionoaory act is that 
which includes the utterance of certain noises, 
the utterance of certain words in a certain 
construction, and the utterance of them with a 
certain 'meaning' in the favourite philosophical 
sense of that word, i.e..with a certain sense and 
with a certain reference.^ 
Thus the act of 'saying something' in such a full 
normal sense, Austin calls 'the performance of a locutionary 
act, and the study of these locutions is the study of the 
full units of speech. 
The locutionary act is associated with the meaning of an 
utterance. But it may further be asked as to how w.hat was 
said was meant by. the speaker and how the words were used or 
how the utterance was to be taken or ought to have been 
taken. So prior to the investigation of the i1locutionary 
acts we need to investigate the meaning of the utterances -
the meaning which according to Austin involves sense and 
reference. 
+^0 
P.F. Strawson explains the locutionary act in terms of 
the three senses of its meaning and analyses the phrase "The 
meaning of what was said*" into three senses. Suppose a 
sentence of a particular language has been uttered on a 
certain occasion and suppose someone X, only knows what 
sentence was uttered but knows nothing of the identity, place 
and time and other circumstances of the speaker. Though X has 
a complete mastery of the language in which the sentence has 
been uttered, he does't know anything of the person (e.g. 
John) to whom the sentence refers. That is, x may not know 
the full import of the sentence. Nevertheless, he knows the 
'meaning' of that sentence in the sense of meaning in terms 
of the syntax and semantics of the language in question. 
Strawson calls this sense of meaning the "1inguistic 
meaning" or the sense A - of meaning. 
Secondly, if X, knowing the sense - A - meaning of 
what was said, is informed about the referents in the 
statement, then, given the knowledge of the name refered to, 
his uptake of the sentence in its full sense would be the 
* The phrase is from Strawson's article on "Austin and 
locutionary meaning" in the Essavj on J.L. Austin. Oxford 
Press, 1973, p.46. 
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"11nquist1c-cum-referent1 a1 meaning" or the 'sense -B-
meaning'. What one learns from the progression of the sense-
A- meaning of what was said, to the knowledge of its sense-B-
meaning is the understanding of the sentence in its full 
referential sense. Hence locutionary meaning is the same as 
sense-B-meaning, such that it includes sense-A-meaning. 
Further, Strawson points out that the full sense of 
'the meaning of what was said, cannot be complete without the 
comprehension of the knowledge of sense-B- meaning of how 
what was said was taken and intended' with its complete 
grasp, together with the knowledge that this grasp was 
complete. This full and complete grasp of 'the meaning of what 
was said' strawson calls the sense-C- meaning or "complete 
meaning". 
Though Austin seems to ignore these developments of the 
meaning of locutionary acts, yet he refers to the linguistic 
conventions which determine the locutionary act and also 
determine it's meaning. 
In his discussion of Austin's theory, Strawson agrees 
with Austin on the point that there are linguistic 
conventions which help to fix the meaning of the utterances 
which effectively means that locutionary acts are 
conventional acts. But he points out that Austin has not made 
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clear, what abstractions from the totals speech act he 
intends to make by means of his notions of meaning and of 
locutionary act. This point Strawson develops in terms of the 
meaning, in relation to the force of an utterance i.e. - the 
locutionary and the i1locutionary act. The meaning of serious 
utterance as conceived by Austin embodies some limitations 
on its force, but sometimes the meaning does not exhaust its 
force, in which case there is no more to know about the 
i1locutionary force of an utterance than we already know what 
locutionary act has been performed. 
To put it simply, 'issuing of an utterance' Austin 
says, involves uttering of certain noises, uttering of 
certain words belonging to a certain vocabulary and 
conforming to certain grammar, and the act of using these 
words with a certain sense and reference which he calls the 
"locutionary act". 
John Searle explains the locutionary act thus: 
In a typical speech situation involving a speaker, 
a hearer, and an utterance by the speaker, there 
are many kinds of act associated with the speaker's 
utterance. The speaker will characteristically have 
moved his jaw and tongue and made noises. In 
addition, he will characteristically have performed 
some acts within the class which includes informing 
or irritating or boring his hearers; he will 
further characteristically have performed acts 
within the class which includes re fee ring to 
Kennedy or Khrushchew or the North Pole; ^-
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Now let us go back to Austin's concept of individual 
utterances, in performing which we do somethig (i.e. 
locutionary acts). These locutionary acts are a means of 
determining what the genus 'speech act' is. To be complete 
locutionary acts embrace doing many things at once. 
Therefore, Austin classifies the locutionary acts into three 
sub-acts of phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts. He says, 
The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering 
certain noises. The phatic act is the uttering of 
certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain 
types, belonging to and as belonging to, a certain 
vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming to 
certain grammar. The rhetic act is the performance 
of an act of using those vocables with a certain 
more-or-less definite sense and reference.• 
1. Phonetic acts or phones: 
The utterance of certain noises or sounds Austin calls 
phones. To utter the noises or sounds in a normal, simple 
sense is to perform a phonetic act. Uttering noises or 
sounds in such a simple, normal sense Lanigan maintains, is a 
conventional rule-governed activity. But Austin does not seem 
to associate phonetic acts necessarily with the conventions 
of language. But the phonetic acts are always a part of 
language - otherwise the utterance would be senseless. 
Sometimes, certain noises or sounds may not be convnentional 
and yet they may fulfil a communicative function. For 
example to express pain, one simply utters the sounds, 'ouch' 
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'ooh' or 'Ah' etc. By content and form these utterances are 
meaningless but they can be expressive in a particular 
situation. But Austin while dealing with the meaning of 
utterances, suggests that phonetic acts often prove to be 
meaningful utterances. But the point is that a monkey's noise 
even if indistinguishable from the gnglish word 'go' can 
not be a meaningful utterance, and conversely a sentence 
"siithy toves did gyre", cannot be a phonetic act, because 
in order to perform a meaningful act' the utterance or a 
sentence involves vocabulary and grammar. Thus a speaker uses 
a word or unit of speech or a symbol for a referent which 
results in a meaningful utterance. To go beyond the 
phonetic act is to move to the second level of the 
locutionary act i.e., the phatic act. Because uttering mere 
noises, without any sense or reference and unregulated by 
vocabulary and grammar cannot result in a locutionary act. 
It must be however, pointed out that, in order to be 
amendable to the movement to the phatic, the phonetic act 
must already be a unit of some language. In the final 
analysis, mere noises cannot be 'phones', i.e. they cannot be 
constituents of a locutionary act. 
J.R. Searle while explaining speech acts, concentrates 
on the point that the speech act is an act of linguistic 
communication, and the unit of linguistic communication is 
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not simply a word, sentence or a symbol etc, but the 
production or the issuance of a word, sentence or symbol. 
Speech acts are the basic units of linguistic communication. 
But the question is, what is the difference between 
regarding an object as an instance of linguistic 
communication and not so regarding it? Searle differentiates 
it in association with the intentional behaviour. 
He says, 
When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper 
to be an instance of linguistic communication, as a 
message, one of the things I must assume is that 
the noise or mark was produced by a being or beings 
more or less like myself and produced with certain 
kinds of intentions: If I regard the noise or mark 
as a natural phenomenon like the wind in the trees 
or a stain on the paper, I exclude it from the 
class of linguistic communication, even though the 
noise or mark may Jaa indistinguishable from spoken 
or written words.^^ 
2. Phatic acts or Phemes 
The phatic act according to Austin, is "the uttering of 
certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types, 
belonging to and as belongi»7to a certain vocabulary, 
conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar".-® 
Since Austin pleads that, the three sub-acts of 
locutionary act constitute a locution all the three sub-acts 
should be considered in relation to each other. And 
obviously it is necessary that in order to perform a phatic 
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act one must perform a phonetic act -in performing one act we 
perform the other also. But the converse is obviously not 
true since, in principle, one may utter a sound which is not 
part of any language, in which case it cannot be called a 
phatic-act, because it is not a meaningful act. Again Austin 
seems to stress upon vocabulary and grammar, which govern a 
phatic act, because a phatic act involves certain types of 
noises necessarily belonging to a certain vocabulary and 
conforming to a certain grammar. 
The phatt'c- act cannot be performed apart from the 
phonetic act, e.g. one cannot utter words without making some 
sounds but one can obviously make noises without uttering 
words. According to Austin phatic acts are also reproducible 
or mimicable like phonetic acts. Sentences can be uttered 
that have no meaning (i.e. without sense and reference) or 
can be 'non-sensical ' , while meanings cannot be conveyed 
without uttering the words (except in a written language) 
which do include phones. Therefore, a phatic act has to be 
understood in relation to the phonetic act. Now let us 
examine the third sub-act, i.e. 'rhetic act' without which 
the locutionary act is incomplete in the Austinian sense. 
3. Rhetic Act or Rhemes 
According to Austin, to perform a rhetic act is, 
"generally to perform the act of using the pheme or 
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its constituents with a certain more or less 
definite 'seTTse' and a more or less definite 
'reference' (which together are equivalent to 
'meaning'). This act we may call a 'rhetic' act and 
the utteranne, which it is the act of uttering a 
'rheme'." ^^^' 
Austin maintains that in rhetic acts we report, a fact. 
For example, 'He said he would go' or "He said that the cat 
was on the mat,' are such rhetic acts. Austin believes these 
are the so-called "Indirect speech" assertions. 
As we know 'Indirect speech' is a method of reporting 
an utterance. There are some mental states, and the reports 
of such states of mind involve the indirect speech 
construction. In this type of speech an indirect intention is 
reported, e.g. 'James said that man is mortal' is not about 
the form of words, but it reports a faith,Kenny says that if 
the word, 'about' which they contain is explained in such a 
sense that a sentence can be about an object if it contains a 
name for that object. But no indirect speech sentence is 
about the form of words. Thus Anthony kenny argues that in a 
sense. 
no oratio obliqua sentence is about a form of 
words. But in this sense - so I shall later argue 
- no sen.tence of any kind is ever about 
anything /•^"^ 
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If an .utterance or sentence is considered to be about 
the form of words produced by a particular speaker in a 
certain situation then no doubt, 'He said, "the cat is on the 
mat"', and 'he said that the cat was on the mat', may be said 
to be about the words - both these sentences are reports of 
utterances. Again Kenny argues that the utterance which it 
reports need not be utterance of the words, e.g., "man is 
mortal", one may have said that man is mortal by uttering the 
words "Homo est mortal is" and such an utterance may also be 
reported in the form, 'James said, "man is mortal". For if 
leaving the sentence 'Homo est mortal is' untranslated, James 
may say e.g. 'man is mortal' in answer to the question what 
is the meaning of 'homo est mortal is'? or after puzzling over 
the crossword clue '0 Smart Milan'. In these cases James does 
not say that 'man is mortal' therefore none of these 
sentences report about the form of words. Kenny relates the 
saying, 'man is mortal' and the saying that man is mortal, to 
Austin's phatic and rhetic acts. 
Sometimes the reference is not clear in these 
assertions, in that case the whole or the part is to be taken 
in quotation marks. For example, we may say. He said, 'I was 
to go to the minister", but did not mention which minister he 
was going to meet. Here reference to a particular name or 
object named is not clear. Now the question is, can we 
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perform a rhetic act without naming and referring? Generally 
it seems that we cannot, but there are cases, e.g., '"All 
triangles have three sides', in which without naming and 
referring, we perform a rhetic act. The above sentence has 
sense, but has no definite reference to a name. 
While explaining Austin's phonetic, phatic and rhetic 
acts in relation to each other, Anthony Kenny says. 
As we have already seen, the same rhetic act may be 
performed by different phatic acts. It is possible 
to perform a phatic act without performing a rhetic 
act at all. This is done, for instance, by the 
peasant who says a Latin prayer without knowing 
the meaning of the words it contains, or the 
schoolboy who writes 'Balbus aedificat murum' as an 
exercise in grammar. But the difference between a 
phatic act and a rhetic act does not seem to be 
adequately made out if we simply say, with Austin, 
that in the rhetic act the words are used with a 
definite sense and reference. For one thing, as 
Austin himself notes, it is possible to perform a 
rhetic act without referring to anything. A speaker 
who says that all triangles have three sides does 
not refer to any triangle or to anything else. 
Further, it is possible for the sense and reference 
of all the words occuring in a pheme to be clear 
and yet for there to be doubt as to what, if any, 
rhetic act is being performed. When Macbeth reacted 
to lady Macbeth's murderous proposals with the 
hesitant words 'If we should fail'? she replied, 
'we fail'. There is no doubt here of the reference 
of 'we* or the sense of 'fail', but it is an open 
question whether Lady Macbeth was asking a 
question, stating a fact, or simply echoing with 
scorn her husband's timorous utterance. For a pheme 
to be a rheme, it seems that it may lack 
reference, but that it must have not only sense but 
also, we might say, mood. The mood of a rheme is 
often made clear by the main verb of the sentence 
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which reports the rhetic act. To ask or to' order 
or to assert is to perform a rhetic act: the rheme 
produced by such an act will be reRnectively a 
question, a command, or a statement. ^ 
R.L. Lanigan thinks that Austin's 'rheme' is a 
linguistic synergism, and it includes phone and pheme. The 
relationship between sense and reference suggests meaning, 
which is not present as merely sense, merely reference or 
merely the summary combination of sense and reference. The 
rheme is a unit of speech and not a unit of language. 
Austin's analysis of rheme confirms that the fault of a rheme 
is 'to be vague or void or obscure'. The three words are 
analogous and are used to describe relationships which are 
ambiguous, structures in which there is percieved sense and 
reference but in which neither has a relationship that is 
definite. 
Now it is clear that Austin's phonetic, phatic and 
rhetic acts are to be considered and understood in relation 
to each other, which together constitute a locution or a 
locutionary act. 
R.A. Lanigan declares that phonology is something that 
could deal with phonetic acts, similarly syntactics may deal 
with phatic acts and that semantics may involve rhetic acts. 
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But the classification itself has been controvertial. 
Walter Cerf in his classification of Austin's locutionary 
acts into phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts points to the 
nature of these acts. As we have already explained, phonetic, 
phatic and rhetic acts are dependent upon each other in a 
hierarchy. As some passages of How To Do Things with words 
suggest these three acts are meant to be subclasses within 
the class of locutionary acts - which is a sub-class of the 
whole speech act. 
Walter Cerf says; 
One cannot utter words without making noises, but 
one can make noises without thereby uttering words. 
Words can be uttered that have no meaning, while 
meanings cannot be conveyed in speech without words 
being uttered. The suspicion arises that the 
phonetic act, the phatic act and the rhetic act are 
not subclasses, but parts of the locutionary act -
as blossom, stem, leaf and root are parts and not 
classes of flowers. And this is what we find Austin 
to imply when he says (P.107) that 'the locutionary 
act embraces doing many things at once to be 
complete'. Phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts belong 
together, not like species of a genus, but like 
parts of a composite. They all have to flow 
together if a locutionary act is to come off. 
Though the hierarchy of dependences indicates 
otherwise, the phonetic act could exist in isolation from 
the other two acts, and the phatic act in isolation from the 
rhetic. But in isolation from each other they cannot make a 
locutionary act. As Austin emphasizes, a locutionary act is 
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any act of saying something in the full normal sense. That is 
why Austin says that phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts are 
inseperable parts and therefore are mere abstractions. All 
three acts are only aspect of a locutionary act. But Cerf 
expresses some reservations about this: 
I do not know if Austin's hiding the phonetic act 
under the 'etc', is a symptom of some unconscious 
sort of behaviouristic commitment that made it 
difficult for him to lower the minimal observable 
core of the wJiole locutionary act to a mere 
abstraction/^^' 
Thus, in any case, phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts are 
no longer parts of a whole, but abstract moments or aspects 
of the locutionary act. And without these aspects being 
present, the locutionary act is not a genuine complete act. 
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(a) LOCUTIONARY VS ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS 
We have already distinguished a group of things we do 
in performing a locutionary act - i.e., phonetic, phatic, and 
rhetic acts. We have also established that the locutionary 
act is equivalent to uttering a sentence with a certain 
sense and reference, which classically is equivalent to 
'meaning'. But as we shall see, the locutionary act itself 
cannot be a genuine and complete speech act in itself, 
unless it is related to the i1locutionary act. Austin says, 
in general the locutionary act as much as the 
illocutionary act is an abstraction only: every 
genuine speech act is both. (This is similar to the 
way in which the phatic AfXy the rhetic act, & C , 
are mere abstractions) .'^ '*^  
We have also discussed Austin's slogan, 'To say 
something is to do something' in the context of 
performatives. Now we shall discuss this statement in 
terms of locutionary and illocutionary acts which are 
performed in our attempt to say something. Now let us see 
what comes out of the distinction between these two acts. 
But first let us try to define the illocutionary act involved 
in saying something. 
Austin says, 
we a lso perform i l l o c u t i o n a r y ac ts such as 
informing, order ing, warning, under tak ing, & c. 
i .e . utterances which have a certain (conventional) 
force .^^^^ 
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Austin's i1locutionary act seems to be a modified form 
of performative act. The illocutionary act can be explained 
like this: Usually in our ordinary speech we use words to do 
something, i.e. to assert some fact or give some information, 
but often also to do certain other kinds of things. For 
example when we utter the words 'I opologize', we do not 
convey an information nor make a statement of fact, but apart 
from its vocabulary and grammar, we engage in a social 
ritual or convention, the point of which is to publicly or 
privately express regret for having committed some wrong 
action. To say 'I apologize' therefore, is not to describe 
anything or state a fact, but it is to perform the act of 
apologizing. Such acts Austin calls illocutionary acts. 
In addition to the locutionary act the speaker would, 
Searle says. 
Characteristically have performed some acts within 
the class which includes informing or irritating or 
boring his hearer; he will further 
characteristically have performed acts within the 
class which includes refering to Kennedy or 
Khrushchev or the North pole: and he will also have 
performed acts within the class which includes 
making statements, asking questions, issuing 
commands, giving reports, greeting, and warning. 
The members of this last class.are what Austin 
called illocutionary acts. ...^^^' 
Any linguistic communication obviously involves 
linguistic acts. It is not the symbol, word or sentence or 
even the token of symbol or word or sentence which is the 
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unit of linguistic communication, but it is pxcduction of the 
sentence token in the performance of the speech act that 
constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication. 
Precisely, the production of the sentence token under certain 
conditions is the illocutionary act, and the illocutionary 
act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication. So far 
we have been dealing with how Austin and Searle define the 
term illocutionary act. Let us now examine how they 
distinguish between locutionary and illocutionary acts. 
According to Austin, 
To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may 
say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary 
act as I propose to call it. To determine what 
illocutionary act is so performed we must determine 
in what way we are using locution: asking or 
answering a question, giving some information or 
an assurance or a warning, announcing a verdict or 
an intention, pronouncing sentence, making an 
appointment or an appeal or a criticism, making an 
identification or giving a description, and the 
numerous like. 
Again Austin says, 
When we perform a locutionary act, we use speech: 
but in what way precisely are we using it on this 
occasion? For there are very numerous functions of 
or ways in which we use speech, and it makes a 
great difference to our act in some sense - sense 
(B) - in which way and which sense we were on this 
occasion 'using' it. It makes a great difference 
whether we were advising, or merely suggesting, or 
actually ordering, whether we were strictly 
promising or,only announcing a vague intention, and 
so forth.^^^' 
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Austin thinks we constantly debate these issues in 
terms of whether certain words or locutions have the force of 
a question, an order, or an announcement, or whether they 
ought to have been taken as an estimate and so on, Austin's 
point here is that there is an i 1 locutionary variability 
within the locutionary constant. 
Austin explains this sense of the performance of the 
' illocutionary act', as the performance of an act in saying 
something as opposed to the performance of an act of saying 
something. This approach to the function of language Austin 
refers to as the doctrine of illocutionary force. Thus 
obviously Austin seems to stress the importance of the 
illocutions rather than the locutionary act, because he 
denies that all philosophical problems are as imagined by 
earlier philosophers, the problems of the 'locutionary 
usage'. Therefore he thinks that the "occasion of an 
utterance matters seriously", and the words used are to some 
extent to be explained by the context in which they have been 
spoken. With regard to the notion of 'meaning', Austin 
concedes that» 
Admittedly we can use 'meaning' also with reference 
to illocutionary force - 'He meant it as an order' 
& c. But I want to distinguish force and meaning 
in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to 
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sense and reference, Just as it has become 
essnetial to distinguish sense and reference within 
meaning. • 
Austin thinks that the word 'use' is as ambiguous and 
broad as the word 'meaning'. On a particular occasion we may 
clear up the 'use of a sentence'in the sense of a locutionary 
act, but we may not touch its use in the sense of an 
illocutionary act. Therefore, the expressions 'meaning' and 
'use of sentence' blur the distinction between locutionary 
and illocutionary acts. 
According to Austin both locutionary and illocutionary 
acts are conventional acts, e.g., doing obeisance. It is 
obeisance only because it is conventional. Or for example 
when we insinuate something in or by issuing an utterance, it 
is by convention that we insinuate towards a particular 
thing, but usually we do not say 'I insinuate'. 
Mats Furberg says. 
Illocutionary acts are characterized by two 
closely connected features: (i) they are 
conventional - done as conforming to a convention, 
(ii) They are upto the speaker, in the sense that 
their successful performance does not demand any 
response from the audience other than a mere 
understanding of their convention - governed force, 
(103 and lectures IX, esp. 115-16). In both these 
respects they resemble locutionary acts and differ 
from perlocutionary ones.• ^^ 
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Furberg agrees with Austin that both locutionary and 
i 1 locutionary acts are rule -governed acts-conforming to 
convention. An utterances locutionary dimension is governed 
by the conventions used in the rhetic act . These 
conventions govern the meaning of an utterance, in a language 
which has passed its initial stage, in its historical 
development independent of what the current speaker intends 
to say and what the uptake of the curent addressee would be 
in response to the speaker. For example, the English 
utterance, I like doing philosophy' simply means that the 
speaker likes doing philosophy. Its meaning is unaffected if 
someone happens to use these words when he actually intends 
to say that he likes doing philology; nor is it affected if a 
certain addressee understands the utterance in the latter 
sense. 
According to Furburg, in a growing language there is a 
close connection betwen what a speaker intends with his 
cluster of noises and what those noises actually mean. 
Usually there are accepted rules which govern the use of the 
components of an utterance of a phone or at a later stage 
words resulting into a locutionary act. These rules are 
accepted only when the majority of language users observe 
them. Obviously when a speaker is well versed in an 
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established language in which he utters the sounds, he is 
used to, and knows the conventions governing the sounds and 
if he performs the utterance in a perfectly conscious state 
that is he is aware of the situations and circumstances, 
then his utterance or the noise or sound does have the 
meaning he intends - which usually results in a successful 
communication. The intentions such as warning etc, seem to 
have a prel inguistic dimension. Animals e.g. seem to make 
warning cries,threatening noises and so on. But Furbe^ points 
out that the issuance of an uterance with a locutionary 
dimension is upto the current speaker ... every act may not 
be conventional. And a distinction parallel to that between 
meaning or what the current speaker means or the hearer 
thinks is meant, has to be made in case of the illocutionary 
dimension. But Austin stresses the conventionality in the 
illocutionary acts which minimises the significance of the 
current hearer as well as the current speaker. 
Again Furberg argues that if both locutionary and 
illocutionary acts are upto the .speaker who knows the 
conventions of the language employed, in no sense can they be 
different. In Austin's writtings the answer to this question 
seems to be that the locutionary aspect is 'topic-directed' 
where-as the illocutionary aspect is 'audience-directed'. 
The terms 'topic-directed' and the 'audiance-directed' are 
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used by Strawson in the "Intention and convention in speech -
acts". Let us take for example the utterance 'S is P'.Here 
the locutionary dimension is concerned with S andP; and the 
illocutionary dimension with guiding the audiance as to how 
what is said about S and P, is to be taken. 
But for Austin, to perform an illocutionary act is 
necessarily to perform a locutionary act, e.g., to 
congratulate is necessarily to utter certain words and to say 
certain words is necessarily to utter certain noises and make 
certain more or less indescribable movements with the vocal 
organs. This points to the conclusion that whenever we say 
something, we perform both the locutionary and the 
illocutionary acts, except perhaps in the case of a mere 
exclamation like 'ouch' or 'damn'. 
The locutionary-illocutionary distinction at first 
seems to be the direct off-shoot of the constative-
performative distinction: Locutionary as the act of saying or 
the constat!ve, and the illocutionary as the act of doing or 
performative. But Austin's stand is quite different on this 
matter. He claims that to state is as much to perform an 
illocutionary act as to warn or to pronounce or declare. 
Stating seems to meet all the criteria Austin gives for 
distinguishing the illocutionary act. For example. 
69 
In saying that it w'as raining I was not betting 
or aruaing or warning: I was simply stating it as a 
Here stating is put absolutely at par with arguing, 
betting and warning. For example, 'I state that he did not do 
it', is exactly at par with, 'I argue that he did not do it', 
'I bet that he did not do it' etc. 
With the constative utterance in its simplest form of 
true and false we abstract from the illocutionary aspects of 
the speech act and we focus on the locutionary act. On the 
other hand with the performative utterance we pay much 
attention to the i1locutionary force of the utterance. 
Austin, at the sametime believes that neither of the two 
abstractions are very useful, in the sense that they are not 
two seperate poles, but rather a historical development. For 
example, methmatical formulas may be the examples of 
constatives and the issuing of simple executive orders or 
giving of simple names may be the examples of performatives. 
Also examples of the kind 'I apologize' and 'the cat is on 
the mat' said for no particular reason suggest the idea of 
two distinct utterances. But at the end Austin feels the need 
to distinguish between the locutionary and the i1locutionary. 
Therefore, Austin's locutionary/i1locutionary distinction. 
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i s the o f f -shoot of the constat ive/per format ive d i s t i n c t i o n . 
With the l a t t e r having the status of a special theory wi th 
respect to the former as a general theory. And the need f o r 
g e n e r a l t h e o r y a r i s e s s i m p l y because t h e t r a d i t i o n a l 
^statement' i s an abs t rac t ion . For s ta t i ng i s only one among 
many speech-acts of the i1 locut ionary c lass , and in general 
every genu ine speech a c t i s bo th l o c u t i o n a r y and 
i1 locu t ionary . 
J.R. Searle in h is a r t i c l e on "Aust in on Locutionary 
and I I l o c u t i o n a r y Acts" c a t e g o r i c a l l y r e j e c t s A u s t i n ' s 
d i s t i n c t i o n between locut ionary and i1 locut ionary acts . 
He says, 
IN ATTEMPTING to exp lore A u s t i n ' s n o t i o n of an 
i1 locut ionary act I have found h is corresponding 
not ion of a locut ionary act very unhelpful and have 
been forced to adopt a qu i te d i f f e r e n t d i s t i n c t i o n 
b e t w e e n . i 1 1 o c u t i o n a r y a c t s and p r e p o s i t i o n a l 
S e a r l e t h i n k s t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between 
i 1 1 o c u t i o n a r y ac t s and t he p r e p o s i t i o n a l a c t s i s more 
f r u i t f u l since i t involves important phi losophical issues 
l i k e , ' na tu re of s ta temen ts ' , how t r u t h and fa l sehood i s 
r e l a t e d to statements and the way what sentences mean, 
re la tes to what the speaker means when he u t te rs a sentence'. 
J.R. Sear le 's f i r s t ob jec t ion to Aus t in ' s d i s t i n c t i o n 
between locut ionary and i1 locut ionary acts i s tha t i t can not 
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be completely general in the sense of marking-off two 
mutually exclusive classes of acts, because meaning in 
Austin's sense determines the i 1 locutionary force of a 
sentence. 
He says, 
Uttering the sentence with a certain meaning is, 
Austin tells us, performing a certain locutionary 
act; uttering a sentence with a certain force is 
performing a certain i1locutionary act; but where a 
certain force is part of the meaning, where the 
meaning uniquely determines a particular force, 
these are not two different acts but two different 
labels for the same act. Austin says that each is 
an abstraction from the total speech act, but the 
difficulty is that for a large class of cases -
certainly all those involving the performative 
use of i 1 locutionary verb - there is no way of 
abstracting the locutionary act WjnJfh does not 
catch an i1locutionary act with it. ^^ 
It is of'course true that the concnept of an utterance 
with a certain meaning is different from the concept of an 
utterance with a certain force. But there are many sentences 
whose meaning is such as to determine that the serious 
utterance of the sentence with its literal meaning has a 
particular force, that is meaning determines the force of a 
sentence. Thus the class of illocutionary acts contains 
members of the class of locutionary acts. The concepts of 
meaning and force are different but they indicate overlapping 
classes for if the illocutionary verbs such as 'I pronounce', 
'I declare', 'I give', etc; are used in a performative 
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sense, the attempt to abstract the locutionary meaning from 
the i1locutionary force would be, Searle says, "like 
abstracting unmarried men from bechelors". The locutionary/ 
i1locutionary distinction is not completely general because 
some locutionary acts are i1locutionary acts. Later, we do 
find that Austin admits that all the members of the class of 
locutionary acts are members of the i1locutionary class, 
because every rhetic act and hence every locutionary act is 
an illocutionary act; also that the conceptual difference is 
not sufficient to establish a distinction between 
locutionary and illocutionary acts. 
But Searle does tentatively conclude that there are two 
quite different distinctions hidden under the locutionary -
illocutionary cloak - one between the meaning and the force 
of an utterance, and the other between a certain part of 
trying and succeeding in performing in performing an 
illocutionary act is, according to Searle the utterance of a 
sentence with a certain sense and reference and successfully 
performing off of illocutionary act. For example, I say, 'I 
hereby order you,to leave', here the utterance has a 
distinction between the uttering of a sentence with a certain 
sense and reference and its success, that is I may have 
uttered the sentence to a person who did not hear me and 
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therefore, the act of performing an illocutionary act of 
ordering is unsuccessful, but still it is a locutionary act. 
But Searle's use of the words "locutionary - illocutionary 
cloak", itself gives the concept of oneness of the two 
different acts. So we may say that these are (locutionary -
i1locutionary) the internal parts of a total speech act. 
Here the question arises that if we take the total speech act 
in Austin's sense, it involves three subacts - locutionary, 
illocutionary and the perlocutionary. And Searle's point of 
trying and succeeding in the performance of an illocutionary 
act reflects the perclocutionary aspect of the speech act. 
Therefore, it is misleading to say that the part of trying 
and succeeding can be related to the performance of an 
illocutionary act, because it is not the case that the 
illocutionary utterance e.g., 'shut the door' has not been 
performed successfully, if the hearer does not respond to the 
order and leaves the door open. But still the illocutionary 
act has been performed by the speaker. 
Secondly, Searle points out an inconsistency in 
Austin's use of direct and indirect quotation, which he 
calls 'oratio recta' and 'oratio obi iaua' . In one place 
Austin uses them to distinguish between the subacts of 
locutionary act-phatic and rhetic act-such that the phatic is 
identified with the oratio recta and the rhetic with the 
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o r a t i o c l i q u e . In another p l ace , he uses the same 
d is t inc t ion to contrast the locutionary and the i1locutionary 
acts. 
Let us quote Searle: 
Prima facie it seems inconsistent to identify the 
locutionary act on one page by the use of direct 
quotation, contrasting it with the i1locutionary 
act which is identified by the use of indirect 
quotation, and then on another page to identify the 
rhetic part of the locutionary act by the use of 
indirect quotation, contrasting it with another 
part of the locutionary act, the phatic act,/V^lch 
is identified by the use of direct quotation.^ 
Searle's charge in this cannection against Austin is 
that in characterizing rhetic acts, we inadvertantly 
characterizes them as i1locutionary acts. Because the verbs 
in Austin's examples of indirect speech - reports of rhetic 
acts are all i 1 locutionary verbs of a very general kind, 
which stand in relation to the verbs in his reports of 
i1locutionary verbs. Therefore, Searle thinks that there are 
no rhetic acts as opposed to the illocutionary acts. For 
there are phonetic acts of uttering certain noises, phatic 
acts of uttering certain vocables and the illocutionary act 
such as making statements, asking questions etc, but it does 
not seem that there are acts of using those vocables or 
words in a meaningful utterance, which are not already 
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i1locutionary acts. So a rhetic act is always an 
illocutionary act of one or the other kind. Thus the 
distinction between mutually exclusive classes of locutionary 
and illocutionary acts collapses. 
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(b) LOCUTIONARY VS ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE 
After explaining locutionary and i1locutionary acts, 
Austin refers to the doctrine of the different types of 
functions of language, which he calls the M 1 locutionary 
force'. By i1locutionary force is meant that the occasion of 
an utterance matters seriously and the words we use are 
explained by the context in which they are spoken, in a 
linguistic interchange. Philosophers have been explaining 
these problems in terms of 'the meaning of words' quite 
mistakenly. But Austin thinks that we could use 'meaning' 
also with reference to i1locutionary force and tries to 
distinguish force and meaning in terms, in which meaning is 
equivalent to sense and reference, just as, it has become 
essential to distinguish sense and reference within meaning. 
On the other hand Searle thinks that the sentence or 
utterances used to perform elementary speech acts have the 
symbolic form f(P), where f indicates i1locutionary force 
and P the prepositional content - so an illocutionary act has 
the logical form F(P). Illocutionary force is a function of 
the meaning of F. 
As we have already (in our previous section) seen 
Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary 
acts collapses. But there still remains a distinction between 
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the literal meaning of a sentence and the intended force of 
its utterance. Here again Searle contends that the 
distinction between what the sentence means and what the 
speaker means in its utterance (literal and intended) has no 
special relevance to the general theory of i 1 locutionary 
forces, because intended i1locutionary force is only one of 
the aspects in which the speaker's meaning may go beyond 
literal sentence meaning. But the question here arises as to 
why Austin ultimately depends on the i1locutionary force of 
y 
jnhappy 
an utterance though he himself confessegfil*!^^ equal 1 
u  with i ts classification. / -^ ^ -' \ 
fiii/ Ace No. . ' 
^^ says; N^/^^-^^^^^^r'^^^ ' 
We said long ago that we needed a l i s t of 
'expl ici t performative verbs'; but in the light of 
the more general theory we now see that what we 
need is a l i s t of i1locut ionary forces of an 
utterance. The old distinction, however, between 
primary and explicit performatives wi l l survive the 
sea-change from the preformative-constative 
distinction to the theory of speech-acts quite 
successfully. For we have since seen reason to 
support that the sorts of test suggested for the 
explicit performative verbs (to say is t o . . . , 
& c) wi l l do, and in fact do better for sorting 
out those verbs which make explicit, as we shall 
now say, the illocutionary force of an utterance, 
or what i l l ocu t ionary act i t is tb3^t we are 
performing in issuing that utterance. ^'*^'' 
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Thus by illocutionary force we mean, the exp-licit 
performativeness as compared to the meaning of an utterance. 
Austin classifies the utterances according to their 
illocutionary force as follows:-
1. Verdictives 
2. Exercitives 
3. Commisives 
4. Behabitives (a shocker this) 
5. Expositives• ®^  
1. Verdictives: are judgements or decisions given by a jury, 
an arbitrator or an umpire. Austin thinks these are 
necessarily decisions of fact or Value, on the basis of 
reasons or evidences. Verdictives are obviously connected 
with truth and falsity as regards soundness and unsoundness 
or fairness and unfairness. The logical inference of a 
verdict is shown for example, in a dispute over an umpire's 
calling 'out', 'three strikes', or 'four balls'. The other 
examples of verdictives according to Austin are: 
"acquit Convict find (as a matter 
of fact) 
hold (as a interpret as understand 
matter of a 
1 aw) 
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read it as 
reckon 
place 
put it at 
grade 
assess 
characterize 
rule 
estimate 
date 
make it 
rank 
value 
diagnose 
calculate 
locate 
measure 
take it 
rate 
describe 
analyse (47) 
2. Exercitives: According to Austin, these "are the exercising 
of powers, rights or influence. Examnles are appointing, 
voting, ordering, urging, warning etc."'- ®' 
According to Austin, in issuing of an exercitive the 
speaker fa judge or an arbitrator) gives a decision or 
judgement in favour of or against a certain course of an 
action. It is a decision or judgement that something is to 
be so; as distinct from the judgement that something is so; 
it is an award as opposed to an assessment. It is usually 
etsentence as opposed to a verdict and constitutes a very wide 
class. Exccercitives are the executions of the acts official 
or unofficial in an ordinary discourse or excercising of 
powers by an official. They cover a large class of acts. Let 
us mention some of them from Austin's list of fixcercitives; 
80 
"appoint 
dismiss 
order 
sentence 
Levy 
choose 
degrade 
excommunicate 
command 
fine 
vote for 
claim 
denote 
name 
direct 
grant 
nominate 
give (49) 
3. Commissives rare simply those actions which commit us to 
do something, that is, certain actions. These are indicated 
by 'promising' or 'undertaking' etc; but they also include 
declarations of the intention which are not promises e.g.; 
espousals. Thus obviously they are connected to verdictives 
and exercitives. 
Austin justifies his point as to how the declarations 
of intention and undertakings can be classed together -
though, they are apparently different. This is so because 
both are covered by the primary performative "shall', thus 
we have locutions 'shall probably', 'shall do my best to' 
etc - which in a sense result into commitments. 
In the descriptions at the one extreme we may just 
state that 'I have an intention', but we may also declare or 
announce our intention. For example, the utterance, 'I 
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declare my intention' does commit us to say 'I intend' which 
is generally to declare. Commissives are such acts where we 
not only state, but also announce; e.g., favour, oppose or 
adopt the view. To say 'I favour X' may be in the context 
of voting for X, or of espousing X, or of applauding X. 
Austin says, 
the whole point of commissives is to commit the 
speaker to a certain course of action. Examples 
are: 
promise 
undertake 
am determined to 
mean to 
covenant 
bind myself 
i ntend 
plan 
deal 
contract 
give my word 
declare my 
intention 
purpose ^^^' 
4. Behabitives : Behabitives /w i t h the a t t i t udes and soc ia l 
behaviour of people, e . g . , a p o l o g i z i n g , c o n g r a t u l a t i n g , 
curs ing or cha l leng ing e t c . Behab i t i ves i n c l u d e p e o p l e ' s 
b e h a v i o u r s and a t t i t u d e s when they r e a c t t o o t h e r ' s 
behaviours or a t t i t udes in connection w i th t h e i r own past or 
present conduct. Obviously these utterances are connected 
w i th both s t a t i n g or d e s c r i b i n g what our f e e l i n g s a r e . 
Austin gives the fo l low ing l i s t of examples:-
1. For apologies we have 'apo log ize ' 
2. For thanks we have ' t hank ' . 
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3. For sv-mpathy we have 'deplore', 'commiserate', 
'compliment', 'condole', congratulate', 'felicitate', 
'sympathize'. 
4. For attitudes we have 'resent' 'don't mind', 'pay 
tribute', 'criticize', 'gumble about', 'complain of; 
'applaud', 'overlook', 'commend', 'deprecate', and the 
non-exercitive uses of 'blame', 'approve', and 'favour'. 
5. For greetings we have 'welcome', 'bid you farewell'. 
6. For wishes we have 'bless', 'curse', 'toast', 'drink 
to', and 'wish' (in its strict performative use). 
7. For challenges we have 'dare', 'defy', 'protest', 
challenge'.^^^^ 
5. ExDositives : Expositives are, generally speaking, those 
acts which expose and make plain how our utterances fit into 
the course of an argument, or conversation - these are how we 
use the words, e.g., we say, 'I reply', 'I argue', 'I 
concede', 'I illustrate', 'I conclude' etc. It can be the 
clarification of arguments, usages and references. Austin 
says that we may dispute as to whether these are not 
verdictives, exercitives, behabitives or commissives as 
well. We may also dispute whether they are not straight 
descriptions of our feelings, practices etc, especially of 
suiting the action to the words, as we say 'I turn next to', 
'I quote', 'I cite', 'I repeat' etc. 
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The list of the examples of expositives as given by 
Austin is as follow:-
1. affirm 
deny 
state 
describe 
class 
identify 
2. remark 
mention 
interpose 
3. inform 
apprise 
tell 
answer 
rejoin 
3a. ask 
4. testify 
report 
swear 
conjecture 
doubt 
know 
believe 
accept 
concede 
withdraw 
agre6 
demur to 
object to 
adhere to 
recognise 
repudiate 
5a. correct 
revise (52) 
Austin compares all five acts of verdictives, 
exercitives, commissives, behabitives and the expositives 
with each other showing that they are all interdependent and 
are interrelated as far as their applicability is concerned. 
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For e.g., the behabitives like 'congratulate' may imply a 
verdict about value or someone's character, and similarly the 
word 'blame' which is equivalent to 'hold responsible' is a 
verdictive, but in another sense it is to form an attitude 
towards a person and is thus a behabitive. Similar is the 
case with all other acts according to Austin. 
David Holdcroft, in his article on'Meaning and 
niocutionary acts', points out that the taxonomy of Austin's 
illocutionary force is open to criticism.Because most of 
the constituents of his first and fifth classes do not 
qualify for their membership. For example, in the case of 
verdictives, which are judgements, or decisions by a Jury or 
an umpire on the basis of evidence, Holdcroft points out two 
elements in Austin's classification e.g. 'grading' and 
'ranking' very trival. 
He s a y s , 
While, i t may be possib le to perform some of the 
acts mentioned in t h i s c l a s s w i t h o u t us ing any 
language at a l l e . g . the ac t s o f g r a d i n g , or 
ranking, i t seems to me so unclear that more than a 
few such acts could be independfi jvt l y i d e n t i f i e d 
under a f u l l descr ip t ion ^^^^ 
On the other hand in the case of expos i t i ves , which in 
A u s t i n ' s sense, c l a r i f y how our u t t e r a n c e s f i t i n t o the 
course of a communication and the class includes such acts as 
s t a t i n g , a f f i r m i n g , deny ing, q u e s t i o n i n g , answering and 
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illustrating, which cannot be performed without saying 
something . 
... there are some marginal cases such as 
withdrawing, objecting or correcting, they are 
sufficiently few for it to be reasonable foe me to 
ignore all the members of this class also .^^^' 
Here Holdcraft seems to misunderstand the total context 
of Austin's discussion. Austin's discussion centres around 
the possible kinds of speech acts which means that the whole 
discourse is located within the domain of language. 
Further, it is true that some speech acts have no non— 
linguistic equivalents or substitutes. For example stating, 
afferming, denying etc.But there are cases where a speech act 
has non linguistic equivalents or substitutes also, 'grading' 
comes under this category. But so do several other acts such 
as warning or objecting, which may be adequately performed 
by raising a finger or shaking one's head or some other 
gestures. But that these acts can have non-linguistic 
equivalents is irrelevent to their status or categorization 
as speech acts. So, Holdcroft's point that grading can be 
performed non-1inguistically does not appear to have any 
relevance as a criticism of Austin's classification of 
i1locutionary acts. 
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Holdcroj ' t again points out tha t the behabitives such as 
a p o l o g i z i n g , t h a n k i n g , d e p l o r i n g , c o n g r a t u l a t i n g and 
welcoming, include the react ion t o other people's behaviour 
and f o r t u n e s , a t t i t u d e s and express ions of a t t i t u d e s t o 
someone's past or present conduct. 
He a r g u e s , 
There is no doubt that most, if not all, 
behabitives can be performed without saying 
anything. What is less clear is whether apart from 
very simple acts of this kind, e.g. welcoming, 
biding someone farewell, applauding a performance, 
that many of these acts could be independently 
identified. Thus, if I congratulate you on your 
recent appointment by uttering the words 
'congratulations on your appointment', and 
clapping you on your back, the utterance of the 
words does seem to play a fairly crucial role in 
making it clear what it is I am congratulating you 
for and how the pat on the back is to be taken. It 
is true that this role cannot be described as 
essential. I could conceivably congratulate you on 
your appointment without uttering these or any 
other words. But then it does seem that the 
situation would have to be structured in a certain 
way and that the utterance of some sentence or 
other would play a crucial role in doing this: i.e. 
if you say 'I 've got the job' and wordlessly I 
clap you on the back, then doubtless in most cases 
I will be taken to be congratulating you for 
getting the job. But someone who did'nt 
understand the setence 'I 've got the job' could 
hardly be expected to realize that this was what I 
was doing - so even in this case an ability to 
understand a sentence seems to be necessary to 
identify the act performed. And it seem to me that 
the identification of the great majority of all but 
the most simple behabitives will involve the use of 
semantic information. ^ '^ '^ 
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The other two classes of exercitiyes and commissives, 
are similarly liable to such criticism. Here Holdcraft points 
out that the distinction between these is not clear, 
...since many acts Austin classes as exercitives 
obviously commit one to courses of action, though 
not all do ... It is clear, I think, that a large 
number of exercitivies and an appreciable number of 
commissives can be performed without saying 
anything. Thus I can order you to leave by 
pointing, excommunicate you by making a ritual 
gesture, or warn you by flapping my arms; and I can 
embrace your cause by standing under your banner. 
However, once again apart from very simple acts of 
either kind it is very unclear that a large number 
could be independently identified - though in case 
of excrecitives it does seem likely that more 
relatively complex acts might be independently 
identified than in the case of any other classes, 
e.g. the acts of ordering (commanding) some one to 
shut the door, ordering (commanding) someone to 
leave the roonu, .or warning someone that the bull 
is dangerous.• ^' 
Austin's taxonomy of i11ocutionary acts has been 
criticized a lot; but let us confine ourselves to Searle's 
discussion of the weaknesses in Austin's classification. 
Searle thinks that Austin's taxonomy of i1locutionary 
force is tentative and can be taken only as a basis for 
discussion but not as an established principle for further 
advancement. But at the sametime the whole taxonomy needs to 
be seriously revised because it has several weaknesses. 
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Firstly, Searle points out that they are not the 
classifications of illocutionary acts but of English 
illocutionary verbs. Classification of different verbs cannot 
be a classification of ilocutionary acts. Some verbs may mark 
the manner in which an illocutionary act is performed e.g., 
"announce". One may announce orders, promises, and reports, 
but announcing is not at all ordering, promising or 
reporting. Announcing is not the name of the type of 
illocutionary act but the way, the manner, in which some 
illocutionary act is performed. 
Searle says that even if we grant and label them as 
illocutionary verbs, still one can level the following 
significant criticisms againt it: 
(i) that the taxonomy is hardly based on any clear and 
systemamtic set of rules, 
(ii) Austin is only clear in the case of commissives, using 
the illocutionary point as the basis of the definition 
of a categoruy 
(i i i )Exposi ti ves seem to have been defined in terms of 
discourse relations, 
(iv) Exercitives seem to have been defined at least partly, 
in terms of the exercise of authority. Both 
considerations of status as well as institutional 
considerations are lurking in it. 
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(v) Behabitives do not seem at all to be well defined, but 
it seems that they involve notions of what is good or 
bad for the speaker and the hearer, in the sense of the 
way the utterance relates to the interests of the 
speaker and hearer as it involves the expressions of 
the attitudes. 
Searle further contends that the classification rules 
are unsystematic. He justifies his point by takig the example 
of the verb "describe" - a significant verb in speech acts -
that Austin lists both as a verdictive and an expositive. 
Although Austin tries to justify his dual inclusion of this 
verb, Searle argues that it is not a convincing 
justification. 
But then any "act of exposition involving the 
expounding of views", could also in his rather 
special sense be "the delivering of a finding, 
official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons". 
And indeed, a look at his list of expositives 
(pp. 161-2) is sufficient to show that most of his 
verbs fit his definition of verdictives as well as 
does "describe". Consider "affirm", "deny", 
"state", "class" "identify", "conclude", and 
"deduce". All of these are listed as expositive, 
but they coalxLJust as easily have been listed as 
verdictives.^^'^ 
Those cases which are not clearly verdictives are 
where the meaning of the verb has purely to do with the 
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discourse r e l a t i o n s , e . g . , 'began by' ' t u r n t o ' or where 
reasons or e v i d e n c e are not needed, e . g . ' p o s t u l a t e ' , 
' n e g l e c t ' , ' c a l l ' e tc . But tha t i s not s u f f i c i e n t to assert 
a separate category, since many of these - 'begin by ' , ' t u r n ' 
to ' neg lec t ' are not names of i1 locut ionary acts at a l l . 
S e a r l e p o i n t s o u t t h a t i n A u s t i n ' s taxonomy, 
categories not only overlap but there are w i t h i n some of the 
categories diverse kinds of verbs. 
Searle says, 
Thus Austin lists "dare", "defy" and "challenge", 
alongside "thank", "apologize", "deplore" and 
"welcome" as behabitives. But "dare", "defy" and 
"challenge" have to do with the hearer's subsequent 
actions, they belong with "order", "command" and 
"forbid" both on syntactical and semantic grounds, 
... But when we look for the family that includes 
"order", "command" and "urge" we find that these 
are listed as, e^ercitives alongside "veto", hire 
and "demote". *^®^ 
But Searle thinks that these also are in two quite 
different categories. The verbs listed within the classes do 
not satisfy the definitions given, even if the definitions 
are taken in a loose suggestive sense. Thus the verbs 
'nominate', 'appoint' and 'excommunicate' are not 'giving 
* "Hire is probably a misprint for "fine" Austin's list in 
HID - 1962,does not include the word "Hire". 
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of a judgement or decision in favour of or against a certain 
course of action', nor are they advocacies. They are rather 
performances of these actions but not advocacies of anything. 
We may agree on a point that ordering, commanding and urging 
someone to do something are all cases of advocating that he 
do it, but nominating or appointing are in no conceivable 
sense tantamount to advocating. For example, when I appoint 
someone Chairman, I do'nt advocate that he be or become 
chairman: I make him chairman. Searle sums up his criticisms 
on Austin's taxonomy of i1locutionary acts saying: 
In sum, there are (at least) six related 
difficulties with Austin's taxonomy; in ascending 
order of importance; there is a persistent 
confusion between verbs and acts, not all the 
verbs are illocutionary verbs, there is too much 
overlap of the categories, too much heterogeneity 
within the categories many of the verbs listed in 
the categories don't satisfy the definition given 
for the category and, most important, ,'y)ere is no 
consistent principle of classification.-^ 
Elaborating on his criticism of Austin's 
classification of illocutionary acts, Searle presents five 
alternatives as a basis of constructing a taxonomy. But 
before discussing his supplant taxonomy it is necessary to 
discuss the components of illocutionary force, as given by 
Searle. Searle points out that the illocutionary acts like 
all other human acts can succeed or fail. Therefore, one way 
to understand the notion of illocutionary act is in terms of 
the conditions of its successful and non-defective 
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performance. For example, an act of excommunication can be 
successful only if the speaker has an authority to 
excommunicate and not otherwise. 
As already mentioned in the concluding remarks of our 
discussion of the constative-performative distinction, 
Searle's notion of "successful and non-defective" speech acts 
is a substitute for Austin's theory of "felicitous and 
infelicitous" speech acts. For Searle, an ideal speech act 
is... 
both successful and non-defective, and for each 
i1locutionary force the components of illocutionary 
force serve to determine under what conditions that 
type of speech act is both successful and non-
defective , at least .as far as its il locutionary 
force is concerned. ^ ^' 
Searle offers sevens compontents of i1locutionary force 
which constitute a nondefective i1locutionary act. 
Seven Components of Illocutionary Force: 
1. Illocutionary point: Each type of illocution has a 
purpose, intrinsic to it's being an act of that type. This 
illocutionary purpose or point according to Searle, is a 
very significant condition for the utterance to be successful 
and non-defective. 
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Each type of illocution has a point or purpose 
which is internal to its being an act of that 
type. The point of statements and descriptions is 
to tell the pepple how things are, the point of 
promises and vows is to commit the speaker to 
doing something, the point of orders and commands 
is to try to get people to do things, and so on. 
Each of these points or purposes we will call the 
illocutionary point of the corresponding act.• '^  
A successful performance of an act of that type 
necessarily achieves that purpose and it achieves it in 
virtue of being an act of that type. It could not be a 
successful act of that type if it did not achieve that 
purpose. Fox example, in our daily life, a speaker may have 
all sorts of purposes e.g., in making a promise one may want 
r 
to reassure his hearer, keep the communication going on, or 
try to appear to be very clever, but none of these is part 
of the essence of promising. But on making a promise one 
necessarily commits oneself to doing something. This type of 
purpose of promising is intrinsic and if one performs the 
act of promising successfully, then one necessarily commits 
oneself to doing something, because that is the illocutionary 
point of the act of promising. Generally, the illocutionary 
point of a type of illocutionary act is that purpose which 
is essential to its being of that type. This has the 
consequence that if the act is successful, the point is 
achieved. The illocutionary point of promise to do the act, 
'A' is to commit the speaker to doing A. On the other hand. 
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the illocutionary point of say an apology for having done act 
A, is to express the speaker's sorrow or regret for having 
done the act A. 
According to Searle, different illocutionary forces 
can have the same illocutionary point or purpose, e.g. in the 
pairs, "assertion-testimony, order-request, promise-vow" etc. 
In each couple both illocutionary forces have the same 
purpose, but differ in other respects. Therefore, the basic 
component of illocutionary force, as pointed out by Searle, 
is the "illocutionary point or purpose". 
2. Degree of Strength of the Illocutionary point: 
There is a degree of strength in achieving the 
illocutionary point. For example, 'request' cannot be as 
strong as 'insist', or on the other hand if we express regret 
for having done something wrong our utterance has lesser 
strength than if we 'humbly apologize', for having commited 
a wrong. For each type of illocutionary force, whose 
illocutionary point requires to be achieved by a certain 
degree of strength, we usually call that degree of strength, 
the characteristic 'degree of strength of illocutionary point 
of F,' or force. 
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3. Mode of achievement: 
According to Searle some of the i1locutionary acts 
require a special set of conditions under which their 
illocutionary point has to be achieved in the performance of 
the speech act. For example, the two utterances of 'command' 
and 'request' have the same illocutionary point - but one who 
issues the command as having an authority to command, does 
more than a speaker who issues an utterance of a request. 
The command achieves the illocutionary purpose by invoking 
the position of authority of the speaker. In order to have a 
successful command, the speaker must not only have an 
authority but must be invoking his authority in issuing the 
utterance. Similarly, a person who makes a statement as a 
witness in a court trial does not merely make a statement but 
testifies it, and his status as witness is what makes his 
utterance count as testimony. These features which 
distinguish e.g. commanding and testifying, from requesting 
and asserting, Searle calls "modes of achievement" of their 
illocutionary point. 
4. Prepositional Content Conditions: 
According to Searle most of the illocutionary acts have 
the formF(P), and in many cases the type of force F will 
impose certain conditions on what can be in the prepositional 
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content, P. For example in promising, the content of the 
promise must be that the speaker will perform some course of 
action in future. One cannot promise that someone else in 
future will do something and one cannot promise that he or 
she has done something in the past. Similarly, an apology 
must be something for which the speaker is responsible, e.g. 
a speaker cannot successfully apologize for the law of 
"modus ponens" or "elliptical orbit of planets". Such 
conditions of the propositional content, imposed by the 
illocutionary force 'F (P)' form, Searle calls "prepositional 
content cond i t i ons". 
5. Prepratory Conditions: 
Searle believes that there are certain other conditions 
afeo which must be met to obtain a successful and nondefective 
type of illocutionary act* For example, if a promise is 
successfully made and has achieved its' illocutionary point 
or purpose, it would still be defective if a certain thing 
promised by the speaker is uninteresting for the hearer and 
certainly is not the thing the hearer wanted him or her to 
do. In making a promise the speaker presupposes that he or 
she can do the promised act, except for the fact the 
promising presupposes the capacity to fulfill it, the other 
points appear i rrelevant,. and that the action is in the 
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interest of the hearer. Similarly, an apology can be made 
only when the speaker-hearer believes that the thing the 
aplogy is sought for is bad or wrong. These necessary 
conditions for the successful and nondefective performance of 
an i1locutionary act, Searle calls, prepratory conditions. In 
the performance of a speech act the speaker presupposes the 
satisfaction of all the prerparatory conditions. These 
conditions determine two classes of presuppositions: those 
peculiar to i1locutionary force and the other peculiar to the 
prepositional content. To illustrate his point Searle picks 
up some famous paradigms: 
To take some famous examples the assertion that the 
king of France is bald presupposes that there 
exists a king of France; and the question whether 
you have stopped beating your wife presupposes both 
that you have a wife and that you have been beating 
her. Regardless of which of the various 
philosophical accounts one accepts of these sorts 
of prepositions, one needs to distinguish them from 
those that derive from i1locutionary forces. The 
same prepositional presuppositions can occur wth 
different illocutionary forces, as, for example, 
one can both ask whether and one P^x assert that 
Jones has stopped beating his wife.'^^' 
6. Sincerity Conditions: 
Searle seems to signify the prepositional content in 
most of the components of illocutionary force as is obvious 
in fifth component of i1locutionary acts also; he says 
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Speakers and hearers i n t e r n a l i z e the rules that 
determine prepratory condi t ions and thus the rules 
a re r e f l e c t e d i n t h e psycho logy of 
s p e a k e r s - h e a r e r s . But t h e s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s 
s p e c i f i e d by t l m ru l es need not themselves be 
psychological .^^^^ 
Here again, in t h i s component the prepos i t iona l content 
i s very v i v i d . Searle says t h a t i n any performance of an 
i l l o c u t i o n a r y act w i th a prepos i t iona l content, a speaker 
exp resses a c e r t a i n P s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e w i t h the same 
con ten t . For example, 
when one makes a statement one expreses a b e l i e f , 
when one makes a promise one expreses an i n ten t i on , 
when one.issues a command one expresses a desire or 
uia«f ( 6 4 ) want 
Thus the p r e p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t he 
i l l o c u t i o n a r y ac t i s i n g e n e r a l i d e n t i c a l w i t h the 
prepos i t iona l content of the expressed psychological s ta te . 
But t h i s does not mean t h a t p r e p a r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s are 
p s y c h o l o g i a l s t a t e s o f t h e s p e a k e r , t hey are r a t h e r 
c i r c u m s t a n t i a l s ta tes of a f f a i r s . Th is exp ress ion of the 
P s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e t h a t one does or does not have, 
d is t ingu ishes the s i n c e r i t y or i n s i n c e r i t y in speech acts. An 
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insincere speech act involves the expression of a 
Psychological state , even though the speaker does not have 
that state of mind. For example, an insincere apology is one 
where the sorrow expressed, is not in his mind or an 
insincere promise is one where the speaker actually does not 
intend to do the things he promises to do. Thus according to 
Searle, an insincere speech act can be defective but not 
unsuccessful. For example, a lie can be a successful 
utterance or assertion but it is defective because the 
speaker is intentionaly insincere. 
The truth that the expression of the Psychological 
state is internal to the performance of the illocution, is 
obvious by the fact that it is self-contradictory to perform 
an il locution and simultaneously deny that one has the 
corresponding psychological state, e.g. one cannot say, 'I 
promise to come but I do not intend to come', or 'I apologize 
but I am not sorry',etc. Searle believes that the 
'expression' of sincerity condition, is the expression of 
one's feelings and attitudes. 
7. Degree of Strength of the sincerity conditions: 
Searle says tha t j u s t as the same i l l o c u t i o n a r y purpose 
can be a c h i e v e d w i t h d i f f e r e n t degrees o f s t r e n g t h , 
s i m i l a r l y , the same psychological s ta te can be expressed wi th 
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different degrees of strength. For example, a speaker who 
makes a request expresses the desire that the hearer does 
the act requested of him or her, but if he or she, "begs, 
beseeches, or implores". he/she expresses a stronger desire 
than in a simple request. Often the degree of strength of the 
sincerity condition and the degree of strength of the 
illocutionary point vary directly. An iUocutionary act of 
e.g., 'ordering' has a greater degree of strength of its 
illocutionary point than a request, even though it need not 
have a greater degree of strength of its expressed intention 
or psychological state.The greater degree of strength of the 
illocutionary point of ordering derives from the mode of 
achievement. The person who gives the order must invoke his 
position of authority over the hearer. Searle concludes by 
saying. 
In cases where illocutionary force requires that 
the psychological state be expressed with a degree 
of strength, we will call that degree of strength 
the characteristic desree of strength of the 
sincerity condition /^^~ 
Thus the discussion of the components of illocutionary 
force, as propounded by Searle enables us to define the 
notion of illocutionary force. An illocutionary force is 
uniquely determined once its illocutionary point, preparatory 
conditions, the mode of achievement of its illocutionary 
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poin t , the degree of strength of i t s i l l o c u t i o n a r y po in t , i t s 
p rorpos i t iona l content cond i t ions, i t s s i n c e r i t y condi t ions, 
and the degree of s t rength of i t s s i n c e r i t y condi t ions, are 
s a t i s f i e d . 
Now S e a r l e i n h i s s u p p l a n t taxonomy ( t o t h a t o f 
A u s t i n ' s taxonomy) o f i 1 l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s rega rds h i s 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as dea l ing w i t h the bas ic c a t e g o r i e s o f 
i l l o c u t i o n s . And at the same t ime he b e l i e v e s t h a t by 
presenting an a l t e rna t i ve he can add greater c l a r i t y to h is 
c r i t i q u e o f A u s t i n ' s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . He takes t h e 
i l l o c u t i o n a r y po in t , i t s c o r o l l a r i e s , d i r ec t i on of f i t and 
expressed s i n c e r i t y as a b a s i s f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g a 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
Searle c l a s s i f i e s the i l l o c u t i o n a r y ac ts , in re l a t i on 
t o t h a t o f A u s t i n ' s i n t o " A s s e r t i v e s " , " D i r e c t i v e s " , 
"commissives" "Expressives" and "Declarat ions" . 
1 . Asser t ives : Searle says, "The point or purpose 
of the members of the assert ive class is to commit 
the speaker ( i n va ry ing degrees) t o someth ing 's 
be ing t h e c a s e , t o t he t r u t h o f t h e exprssed 
p ropos i t i on . A l l of the members of the asser t ive 
class are assessable on the dimension of assessment 
which includes t rue and fa lse. '^^^ ' ' 
S e a r l e uses F r e g e ' s a s s e r t i o n - s i g n t o mark t he 
i l l o c u t i o n a r y po in t and symbolizes t h i s class as, 1- (P), 
The d i r e c t i o n of f i t or match is of words to the world and 
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the psychological state expressed is Belief (That P). The 
words such as "belief" and "commitment" are intended to mark 
dimensions rather then determinents. Thus, there is a 
difference on the one hand, between suggesting that P or 
hypothesizing that P, and on the other hand between insisting 
that P or swearing that P. The degree of belief or commitment 
may approach or even reach zero, but it is clear that 
hypothesizing that P and simply stating that P are in the 
same line of business in a manner which makes them different 
from requesting. Once the existence of assertives as a 
seperate class is recognized; based on the notion of 
illocutionary purpose, the large number of performative verbs 
that denote illocutions, mark features of illocutionary 
force which are additional to illocutionary point. For 
example, the words, 'boast' and 'complain' denote assertions 
with the added feature that they have something to do with 
the interest of the speaker. The words, 'conclude' and 
'deduce' also are assertives but with the added feature, that 
they mark certain relations between the assertive 
illocutionary acts and the rest of the discourse, Searle 
says ; 
This class will contain most of Austin's 
expositives and many of his verdictives as well 
for the, by now I hope obvious, reason that they 
all have the same illocutionary point and differ 
only in other features of illocutionary force. The 
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. simplest test of an assertive is this: can you 
literally,characterize it (inter alia) as true or 
false.'^^> 
2. Directives: 
The illocutionary point of the directives consists, 
according to Searle, in the fact that they are attempts (of 
varying degrees, and hence, more precisely, they are 
determinates of the determinable which includes attempting) 
by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. They may 
be very modest "attempts" as when I invite you to do it or 
suggest that you do it, or they may be very fierce attempts 
Qs when I insist that you do it using the shriek mark for the 
illocutionary point indicating device for the members of this 
class generally, we have the following symbolism: 
"! i* W(H does A)" 
Here the d i r ec t i on of f i t or match i s world-to-words 
and the s i nce r i t y cond i t ion i s want, wish or desi re. The 
p repos i t i ona l content i n these c lasses i s always t h a t the 
hearer H does some f u t u r e a c t i o n A. Denot ing verbs of 
d i rec t i ves are ask, order, command. request, beg, plead, pray 
e n t r e a t ' . and also i n v i t e , permit and advise. Searle th inks 
t h a t A u s t i n ' s l i s t o f b e h a b i t i v e s l i k e d a r e . de fy and 
challenge reside in t h i s c lass . Many of Aus t in ' s exerc3 ' t ives 
are a lso in t h i s c l a s s . Sear le says t h a t ques t ions are a 
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subclass of directives, since they are the attempts by the 
speaker to get the hearer to answer the question, i.e., to 
perform a speech act. 
3. Commissives: 
Searle points out that many verbs which Austin lists as 
commisive verbs do not belong to this class at all, e.g. the 
word "shall", "intend", "favour" etc. He says. 
Commissives then are those i1locutionary acts 
whose point is to commit the speaker (again in 
varying degrees) to some future course of action. 
Using "C" for the members of this class generally, 
we have the following symbolism. 
"C I I (S does A)" 
The direction of fit is world-to-word and the sincerity 
condition is Intention. The prepositional content is always 
that the speaker does some future action A .'^^^ 
A. Expressives: 
The i1locutionary point of expressives is, Searle says 
... to express the Psychological state specified 
in the prepositional content. The paradigms of 
expressive verbs are "thank", "Congratulate", 
"apologi zje"' "condole", "deplore", and 
"welcome". *^^^ 
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Searle believes that expressives have no direction of 
fit, because the truth of the expressed proposition is 
presupposed. For example, if A apologizes for having stepped 
on B's toe, A's purpose is not to claim that B's toe was 
stepped on nor to get it stepped on. Let us take up the 
syntactical paradigm expressive verbs, which in their 
performative occurance will not take that - clauses but 
require a gerundive nominalization transformation e.g., one 
cannot say: 
I apologize that I stepped on your toe: the correct 
English sentence would be, I apologize for stepping on your 
toe. Similarly one cannot say: 
"I congratulate you that you won the race", one 
must say, "I congratulate you on winning the.race", 
or "congratulations on winning the race".^'^^ 
These syntactical facts, Searle suggests are 
consequences of the fact that there is no direction of fit in 
expressives. In an expressive, the truth of the proposition 
is presupposed. Therefore its symbolization must proceed as, 
"E ^ (P) (S-H+ property)" 
Here "E" i nd i ca tes t h a t the i 1 l o c u t i o n a r y purpose 
common to a l l expressives ";2f^ " i s a void symbol ind ica t ing no 
d i r e c t i o n o f f i t , " p " i s a v a r i a b l e r a n g i n g over t he 
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different possible psychological states, and the 
propositional content ascribes some property either to the 
speaker or the hearer. 
For example, I can congratulate you not on winning the 
race but on your good looks also. However, the property 
specified in the propositional content of an expressive must 
be related to the speaker or the hearer. 
5. Declarations: Searle says. 
It is the defining characteristic of this class 
that the successful performance of one of its 
members brings about the correspondence between the 
propositional content and reality, successful 
performance guarantees that the propositional 
content corresponds to the world: if I successfully 
perform the act of appointing you chairman, then 
you are chairman; if I successfully perform the 
act of nominating you as candidate, then you are a 
candidate; if I successfully perform the act of 
declaring a state of war, then war is on: if I 
successfully perform the act of marying you, then 
you are married.^ 
Searle thinks that declarations bring about some change 
in the condition or states of the object referred to, in 
virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully 
performed. This feature distinguishes declarations from other 
categories. As we have seen in our exposition of Austin's 
performative/ constative distinction, declarations are 
obviously treated as performance, but Searle points out, that 
the distinctive feature of declarations has not been 
properly understood. Searle says that what he calls as 
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d e c l a r a t i o n s , a re i n c l u d e d i n A u s t i n ' s - c l a s s o f 
p e r f o r m a t i v e s ; t h a t i s why S e a r l e c a l l s h i s c l a s s of 
dec la ra t i ons as a spec ia l ca tegory of speech a c t s . The 
symbolic s t ruc tu re of declarat ions would be: " D ^ ^ ( P ) " . 'D ' 
i n d i c a t e s t h e d e c l a r a t i o n a l i 1 1 o c u t i o n a r y p o i n t , t he 
d i r ec t i on of f i t i s both words-to-world and wor ld- to words, 
but there i s a nu l l symbol in the s i n c e r i t y cond i t ion and a 
usual p repos i t iona l var iab le ' p ' i s used. 
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Part I I I 
(a ) ILLOCUTIONARY VS PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS 
Now l e t us l ook back t o our e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n o f 
i n 
l o c u t i o n a r y - i l l o c u t i o n a r y d i s t i n c t i o n , / w h i c h we t a l k e d about 
A u s t i n ' s t w o s e n s e s - sense A ( l o c u t i o n ) and sense B 
( i l l o c u t i o n ) i n vo l ved i n the performance o f an act o f say ing 
something i . e . , a speech a c t . A u s t i n be l i e ves t h a t t he re i s 
another sense C, o f the performance o f an ac t of say ing " i n 
w h i c h t o p e r f o r m a l o c u t i o n a r y a c t and t h e r e i n an 
i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t , may a l so be t o per form an ac t o f another 
k i n d " - * - ^ ' i . e . , the p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a c t . 
L e t a c t us c o n s i d e r A u s t i n ' s e x a m p l e s f o r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the th ree a c t s - l o c u t i o n a r y , i l l o c u t a t i o n a r y 
and p e r l o c u t i o n a r y r e s p e c t i v e l y : (E .2 ) 
Act (A) o r Locu t ion 
He s a i d t o me, 'you c a n ' t do t h a t ' 
Act (B) o r I l l o c u t i o n 
He p r o t e s t e d aga ins t my do ing i t . 
Act (C .a ) or P e r l o c u t i o n 
He p u l l e d me up, checked me. 
Act (C .b ) 
He stopped me,.be,brought me t6 my senses, & c, 
He annoyed me.^^^^ 
109 
I n A u s t i n ' s scheme, a speech a c t i s o b v i o u s l y 
incomplete wi thout the per locut ionary ac t . And his contention 
i s t h a t 
saying something w i l l o f t e n , or even n o r m a l l y , 
produce c e r t a i n consequent ia l e f f e c t s upon the 
f e e l i n g s , thoughts or act ions of the audience, or 
of the speaker or of other persons: and i t may be 
done w i t h the des ign, i n t e n t i o n , or purpose of 
may then say, th ink ing of 
has performed an act in the 
producing them; and we 
t h i s , t ha t the speaker 
nomenclature of which 
( c . a . ) only ob l ique ly , 
t o t h e pe r fo rmance 
i l l o c u t i o n a r y ac t . 
an a c t o f t h i s 
per locut ionary act or perlocuton 
r e fe rence i s made e i t h e r 
or even ( c . b . ) not at a l l , 
o f t h e l o c u t i o n a r y or 
We sha l l c a l l the performance of 
k i n d t h e pe,rif ormance of a 
Again, Aust in says, 
Th i r d l y , we may also perform per locut ionary acts, 
what we b r i n g about or a c h i e v e by say ing 
s o m e t h i n g , such as c o n v i n c i n g , p e r s u a d i n g , 
d e t e r i n g , /-^Ad even , say s u r p r i s i n g or 
misleading .^'^' 
I t i s evident tha t in Aus t in ' s speech act theory, the 
per locut ionary i s a c ruc ia l component, although Austin does 
not seem t o put i t on exac t l y the same f o o t i n g as the 
locut ionary and i l l o c u t i o n a r y aspects. However, the point to 
be noted i s tha t the r e l a t i on between the i l l o cu t i ona ry and 
the per locut ionary i s more complex and more problematic than 
the r e l a t i o n of the i l l o c u t i o n a r y w i th the locut ionary act . 
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So, before going into the details of. the nature of the 
perlocutionary act itself, it may be worthwhile to look at 
its relation to the illocutionary act. 
We can distinguish the illocutionary act, e.g. 'he 
argued that ...' from the perlocutionary act, e.g. 'he 
convinced me that ...' It shows that the illocutionary is 
conventional whereas the perlocutionary is not, in the same 
sense a conventional act. In saying, 'he argued that ...' 
shows that the speaker performs an act of argument, it is so 
called by virtue of certain conventions going various forms 
discourse. Whereas the utterance 'he convinced me that ...' 
is an act which involves the effect or the consequences of 
convincing on a particular subject, by the speaker, i.e. the 
utterance has the effect of convincing the audience, which 
is not conventional, in so far it is more of a causal 
relation. The illocutionary act is said to be coventional in 
the sense that it could be made explicit by the performative 
formula, but the per locuti nary cannot. Thus in an 
illocutionary act we can say, 'I argue that', or 'I warn you 
that', but not 'I convince you' or 'I alarm you'. The acts 
of warning (illocutionary) or the acts of convincing 
(perlocutionary) can be performed or brought-off non-
verbally, but even then, Austin believes that the 
illocutionary act, e.g.; of warning must be a conventional 
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non-verbal act e.g. by swinging a stick. However, although 
the perlocutionary acts are themselves not conventional acts, 
conventional acts may be made use of in order to bring off a 
perlocutionary act. For exmple, a judge may decide, by 
hearing what was said, what locutionary and i1locutionary 
acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were 
achieved-
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(b) SAYING AND DOING THROUGH SPEECH 
Austin gives a formula for distinguishing the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. He says, "In saying X 
I was doing y' or 'I did y', 'By saying X I did y' or 'I 
was doing y'".<76) 
With these formulas Austin tries to distinguish 
between the illocutionary verbs i.e. 'In saving", with the 
perlocutionary verbs, i.e., 'bv saving. For exmaple, 'In 
saying I would shoot him I was threatening him'. 'By saying 
I would shoot him I alarmed him'. 
But the formula seems to give trouble for two reasons: 
First 'In saying X I was doing y', is not confined to 
illocutionary acts only. It seems applicable to the 
locutionary as well as perlocutionary acts. For example, 'In 
saying "Iced ink" I was uttering the noises "I stink", or 
besides these there are other miscellaneous cases such as 
'In saying X you were making a mistake or 'running a risk'; 
to make a mistake Austin says is certainly not to perform an 
illocutionary act nor, for that matter, a locutionary act. 
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But the fact that it is not confined to i1 locution^ry 
acts may be taken care of by arguing that 'saying' is 
ambiguous, that 'saying' can be replaced by 'speaking of or 
'using the expression or instead of 'in saying x' we could 
say 'by the word x'. But here also, the perlocutionary act, 
appears to have reference to the phatic act rather than the 
rhetic act. On the other hand, 'In saying that he was making 
a mistake', we could replace without changing the sense of 
the sentence, 'In saying that he made a mistake' or 'By 
saying that he made a mistake', but we do not say 'In saying 
that I protested' nor 'By saying that I was protesting'. 
Secondly when we claim that the 'In saying' formula 
does not go with perlocutionary verbs like 'convinced', 
'persuaded' etc, exceptions arise through the incorrect use 
of language. For example, people say ' Are you intimidating 
me? "instead of 'threatening' and we may say 'In saying he 
was intimidating me'. Also the same word may be used in both 
i1locutionary and perlocutionary ways, e.g.; the verb, 
'tempting' may be used in either way. We do not have 'I tempt 
you to', but we do have 'let me tempt you to', or we may 
say 'Do have another whack of Ice-cream' - 'Are you tempting 
me'? This last question will be vague in a perlocutionary 
sense, since it would be only one for the speaker to answer, 
if anyone. If the answer is 'Oh, why not'? it seems that 
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I am tempting him, but in reality he may not be tempted. 
Again Austin says 'trying to' seems an addition with a 
perlocutionary verb. But i1locutionary cannot be equivalent 
to 'try to' do something which might be expressed by a 
perlocutionary verb, e.g. 'argue' is equivalent to 'try to 
connvince' or 'try to alarm or 'alert'. The distinction 
between doing and trying to do is already there in 
i1locutionary as well as in the perlocutionary verb. Many 
i1locutionary acts are not cases of trying to do any 
perlocutionary act, e.g. to promise is not to try to do 
anything. Still we may ask whether 'In saying' can be applied 
or used with the perlocutionary acts. Therefore, we find that 
Austins's contrast of 'In saying' with that of 'By saying' 
its confusing and ambigous, in its first sense of 'in 
saying' as applicable to the perlocutions. 
On the other hand the 'By saying' formula is also not 
confined to the perlocutionary verbs. According to Austin 
there is the locutionary use of 'By saying I meant y...', 
the illocutionary use of 'By saying X I was thereby warning' 
and a variety of miscellaneous use, for example. By saying X 
I put myself in the wrong. But at least there are two uses of 
'By saying'. 
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"(a) By hitting the nail on the head I was driving it into 
the wal1, 
(b) By inserting a plate, I was practising dentistry". 
The (a) 'By saying', indicates the means by which we 
bring off the action and in (b) 'By saying', indicates a 
criterion about what I did which shows my action to be 
practising dentistry. There is the only difference between 
the two that the use to indicate criterion seems more 
external. And this (b) sense (criterion sense) seems very 
close to the 'In saying' formula. For example, 'In saying X 
I was warning him'. 
We can certainly use 'By saying X I was warning him'. 
But 'By' in this sense is not used with perlocutionary verbs. 
For example, if I say 'By saying I convinced him' 'by' will 
have the means to end sense or may signify the method by 
which I did it. Austin thinks that 'By' formula is used in 
'means-to-end sense' with an i1locutionary verb in two kinds 
of cases: 
(a) We use verbal means of doing something instead of non-
verbal, e.g., 'By saying "I do", one gets married, here the 
performative utterance 'I do' is a means to the end of 
marriage. Here again we use the phatic and not the rhetic 
acts. 
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(b) A performative utterance is used as an indirect means 
to perform another act. For example, 'By saying, "I bid 
three clubs" We are informed that one had no diamonds. The 
performative use of 'I bid three clubs' is an indirect means 
of informing - which is an illocutionary act. 
Therefore we find that Austin's 'By' formula is 
applicable to the performative*and illocutions also. There we 
find that the two formulas of "In" and "By" for 
distinguishing the illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts 
is misleading and the distinction collapses, like other 
distinctions attempted by Austin. 
Thus it becomes expedient to discuss the illocutionary-
perlocutionary in terms of consequences and effects, which is 
the characteristic feature of perlocutions. 
These perlocutions are usually, but not always, effects 
or consequences of the performances of illocutionary acts. 
But the question is whether these perlocutions are only part 
of speech act, (particularly performative), or only the 
consequences of locutions and illocutions. Austin seems to 
rule out the perlocutionary sense of 'doing an action' and 
therefore it is not an issuance of an utterance in the sense 
of a performatory action. A perlocutionary act can be 
brought-off, in "sufficiently special circumstances" by any 
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Utterance. Constative or performative, e.g. to inform some 
one before hand about the consequences of doing something, or 
convincing someone about some fact by stating or uttering 
certain perlocutionary words or sentences. The giving of an 
information always produces consequential effects upon that 
action; and conversely doing any action has always 
consequences of making ourselves and others aware of certain 
facts, e.g. the effect of hurling a tomato at a political 
meeting will be to make others aware that one objects to or 
contends against certain political beliefs others hold - but 
this will not make the utterance (e.g. shout) or the throw 
(a physical act) true or false, and in the same way, the 
production of any number of consequential effects will not 
prevent a constative utterance from being true or false. 
Thus to produce consequences by saying something, Austin 
calls perlocutionary acts. 
According to Austin, effects and consequences can come 
in even with i1locutionary acts, because a successful 
performance of an i1locutionary act does bring in 
consequences and effects in certain senses, namely 'securing 
uptake'. 'taking effect' and 'inviting responses'. 
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1. Securing uptake 
We achieve a certain amount of effect on the 
audience, for the illocutionary act is to be carried out as a 
successful act. Effect here amounts to bringing about 
understanding of the meaning and the force of the locution 
or the utterance, e.g. it cannot be said 'to have warned' 
unless the hearer or the audience hears and understands 
what we say and what we mean with a certain force, by the 
illocutionary act of warning. So the performance of an 
illocutionary act involves the 'securing of uptake'. 
2. Taking effect 
The illocutionary act 'takes effect' in a particular 
way, unlike consequences, in the natural course of events, 
e.g. the utterance 'I name this ship Queen Elizabeth' has 
the effect of naming the ship, and certain subsequent acts 
such as referring to it as 'Generalissimo Stalin' will be out 
of order and therefore unsuccessful. 
2. Inviting responses 
According to Austin, many illocutionary acts by 
virtue of convention invite a response or a sequel 1, which 
may be 'one way or two way'. For example, arguing, ordering 
or promising etc, have one way relationship between a speaker 
and hearer whereas offering has a two way relationship 
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between the speaker or hearer. However, the second part of 
this two-way interaction is a separate speech act and not 
part of the original speech act. 
Austin believes that the perlocutions are not 
conventional acts at all, whereas i 1 locutionary acts are 
conventional- But the question is whether perlocutionary acts 
always, achieve their response by non-conventional means, 
and can responses in i 1 locutionary acts be achieved by 
nonverbal means? For both questions the answer is 'yes'. For 
example, an i1locutionary act of warning may be performed 
non-verbally by swinging a stick, but the difficulty arises 
that the other person or the audience may take the guesture 
as an act of threatening. Therefore, it is a fact that most 
of the illocutionary acts cannot be performed without saying 
something, e.g. stating, informing, arguing, estimating etc 
which fall in the class of verdictives and expositives. On 
the other hand perlocutionary effect can be achieved by non-
conventional means, e.g. Austin says; "Thus I may persuade 
some one by gently swinging a big stick or gently mentioning 
that his aged parents are still in the third Reich".^^®^ 
Thus illocutionary acts can be conventional acts 
whereas perlocutionary are not conventional. Both kinds of 
acts can be performed non-verbally but illocutionary acts 
like warning must be conventional even if non-verbal acts. 
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But pe r l ocu t i ona ry acts are not e s s e n t i a l l y l i n g u i s t i c , 
because pe r l ocu t i ona ry e f f e c t s can be achieved w i t h o u t 
performing any speech-act at a l l , whereas the i1 locut ionary 
acts are l i n g u i s t i c acts . 
Searle fo l low ing Austin says: 
When an i l l o cu t i ona ry act i s successfu l ly and non-
d e f e c t i v e l y performed t h e r e w i l l always be an 
e f f e c t produced i n the hea re r , the e f f e c t of 
understanding the ut terance. But in add i t ion to the 
i1 locut ionary e f f ec t of understanding, utterances 
n o r m a l l y p roduce , and a re o f t e n i n t e n d e d t o 
p r o d u c e , f u r t h e r e f f e c t s on t h e f e e l i n g s , 
a t t i t u d e s , and subsequent behaviour of the hearers. 
These e f fec ts are ca l led per locut ionary e f f ec t s , 
and t h e a c t s of p r o d u c i n g them are c a l l e d 
pe r l ocu t i ona ry a c t s . For example, by making a 
statement ( i 1 locu t ionary ) a speaker may convince or 
persuade (per locut ionary) h is audience, by making a 
promise ( i1 locu t ionary ) he may reassure or create 
expectations (per locut ionary) in h is audience. 
The pecu l i a r i t y about Sear le 's view of per locut ions is 
tha t he stresses the i n ten t i ona l and unintent ional aspects 
o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s - which A u s t i n d i s c u s s e d o n l y 
p e r f u n c t o r i l y . From p e r l o c u t i o n s , S e a r l e expounds and 
develops h i s famous theory of ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ' . For h im, 
per locut ionary e f fec ts may be achieved i n t e n t i o n a l I v . as we 
get the hearer to do a p a r t i c u l a r th ing by asking him or her 
to do i t , or per locut ionary e f f e c t s may be un- in tent iona l , 
as e . g . , when we do not intend to annoy or exasperate the 
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audience, but by some misunderstanding the audience gets 
angry or annoyed. Because there is no convention involved in 
the perlocutionary effect that such and such utterance counts 
as convincing or persuading or annoying etc. Searle says,"And 
that is why none of these perlocutionary verbs has a 
performative use". For example, there cannot be a 
performative expression like "I hereby persuade You" because 
there is no way that the conventional performance can 
guarantee that you are persuaded as compared to the 
performance can guarantee that you are persuaded as compared 
to the performative expressions like "I hereby state" or "I 
hereby inform you" which involve conventions. Thus Searle 
thinks that i1locutionary acts are by themselves proper and 
complete speech acts, and therefore, "perlocutionary acts, 
unlike i1locutionary acts, are not essentially linguistic, 
for it is possible to achieve perlocutionary effects without 
performing any speech act at all".- ^^  
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